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Chapter One: Introduction
This paper will outline the internal and external factors that
have spurred the People's Republic of China (PRC) to issue strong
rhetoric and naval expansion in the defense of their claims to
territory in the South China Sea (SCS).

An analysis of the PRC's

posturing will provide the contextual background necessary for
answering the following research question central to this paper.
What strategies have relatively less capable states engaged in the
region as a reaction to the advancing capacity of the PRC?
The escalation of tensions between the PRC and other states in
the region, namely, the Republic of Singapore, the Republic of the
Philippines, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, will be analyzed
with applicable theoretical framework.

Each of these states will be

treated in separate case studies to address the inquiry.
Main Argument
After the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s subsided, the
relative economic power of the PRC was noted.

Through great efforts

of diplomacy, the PRC was seen as a good neighbor for nearly a
decade.

However, after the global financial crisis that began in

2008, the PRC leadership felt inclined to flex its military and
diplomatic strength.

Since then, the Southeast Asian states have

become weary of the complications of PRC dominance in the region.
Without outside actors, PRC dominance is inevitable due to the
relatively weaker position, in terms of economic development as well

6

as military capacity, of the Southeast Asian states.

Despite what

seemed to be a harmonious rise, the PRC is likely facing a generous
level of engagement coupled with significant external balancing
moving forward.
As the United States (US) military has maintained a heavy
presence in East Asia since the Pacific War, and the current
administration has proclaimed its commitment to increasing its
presence in the region, its role with regard to the balance of power
is likely an essential ingredient for the strategy employed by the
Southeast Asian states in question in their response to the PRC's
growing capacity in the SCS.

The Hanoi regime, which is most

skeptical of US involvement in the region's affairs, will not balance
the PRC with its ties to the US alone.

The Socialist Republic of

Vietnam has had a long standing relationship with Moscow, and will
likely exploit that as an additional means to balance.
The three relatively small states analyzed in this paper cannot
depend on external balancing alone.

States in the region will

attempt to balance the growing military influence of the PRC in the
SCS by developing their own military capacity.

As these states

control much smaller economies and command weaker military forces,
internal balancing can only provide a secondary deterrent against PRC
advancements in the SCS.

Regardless of the outcome in the SCS, the

PRC has become the region's most highly productive economy and will
likely maintain this position indefinitely.

For this reason alone,
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engagement through diplomacy and trade is necessary.
Moreover, each state is likely to develop a multifaceted
strategy in response to the PRC's growing capacity and assertiveness
in the SCS, with external balancing as the chief constituent.

As

considerations on the future relations with the region's leading
state economy are a crucial element of the Southeast Asian states'
long-term interests, coupled with the uncertainties of dealing with
supra-regional states, this external balancing may not necessarily be
realized by the establishment of formal military alliances with other
powers, but by some softer form of external balancing.
Significance of Inquiry:
Since the 1970s, the Southeast Asian states in question have
managed relations with the PRC over territorial disputes within the
SCS.

Complicated by these states' limited naval capacity and the

competition between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR), minor naval
skirmishes occurred, transferring administration of islands in the
SCS and creating political momentum surrounding the SCS issue.
However, territorial disputes in the SCS have never been as heated as
those witnessed in the preceding half decade.
The PRC has recently increased its capacity to project power
into the SCS to such a degree that it is unclear whether any regional
states could adequately deter or resist any potential aggression by
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) navy (PLAN).

As a consequence,

the common themes of “peaceful rise” and “good neighbor diplomacy”
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(Lin et al. 2005, 1), ubiquitous in international relations prior to
2008, have been deteriorating into sentiment erring on the side of
caution for the states with an interest in the SCS (Dutta, 2005, 269270). Further exacerbating the potential for mistrust and
miscalculation, the PRC leadership has its own concerns.

Regional

states, especially the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, have also projected their power in the SCS,
occupying islands, capturing Chinese merchant vessels, and increasing
ties with states that could counterbalance the PRC's naval capacity
and territorial ambitions.
In this unstable international order where overlapping and
competing territorial claims are settled by coercive measures or at
least treated with strong rhetoric threatening the same, the PRC
leadership feels that it must also grapple with a domestic order of
potentially greater risk.

With a burgeoning domestic demand for

hydrocarbon and marine resources, in addition to the steady shift
toward an outward leaning economy, which has has been maturing since
the reform and opening policies (Gǎigé kāifàng), that is heavily
dependent upon the shipment of a significant fraction of import and
exports through the SCS, the PRC leadership is also erring on the
side of caution by increasing security of these matters moving
forward.

Such socioeconomic realities are not solely experienced by

the Chinese, with freedom of navigation in the SCS being asserted by
scholars and practitioners as a supra-regional concern.

The

9

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of the Philippines, and
the Republic of Singapore are also experiencing economic expansion,
an increasing demand for resources, and with the exception of the
Republic of Singapore, these states are also participants in the
territorial disputes.

Essentially, there is some commonality between

the PRC and the regional powers in the substance of concern fueling
the conflict.

Resulting from this conflict of perceived national

interests, the potential for destabilizing security competition
between these states is a growing possibility.
Military security is of course not the sole means by which a
state can secure its interests.

The PRC and the regional powers

addressed in this paper have been increasing their efforts in
diplomacy, alliance building, and military development
simultaneously.

The key multilateral organization, the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has been the preferred diplomatic
mechanism through which the Southeast Asian states have pursued a
peaceful resolution to the issue, with particular effort invested in
the advancement of a binding code of conduct.

In 2002, a non-binding

code was authored by the ASEAN forum, but it has been sharply
criticized as ineffective in creating norms of behavior.

Validating

this criticism, provocations in the SCS have escalated since 2008.
As this is truly a supra-regional issue, considering the volume of
shipping that travels through the SCS, states outside the region have
become involved diplomatically.

In addition to economic concerns,
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the so-called “hub-and-spokes” alliance format, a vestige of the Cold
War which features the US in bilateral security cooperation with many
East Asian states, complicated the balance of power in the region.
Moreover, the US Navy could intervene if tensions erupt into armed
conflict, as the US may justify such behavior by referring to its
previous commitments to protect the freedom of navigation and may be
obligated by legally binding defense treaties.
As one of the single most important bodies of water with regard
to global commerce, and potentially energy reserves, the SCS disputes
are a necessary subject of study.

Detailing how these three states

of relatively less capacity cope with the rising power of the PRC
will require applying international relations theory while
simultaneously highlighting the nature of the potential flashpoint
that is the SCS.
Limitations on the Scope of Research:
As there is little evidence that economic and multilateral
organizations and treaties have provided any effective constraint on
state behavior, their analysis will be limited in this paper.
is the chief organization involved in the SCS disputes.

ASEAN

Despite

efforts taken by the ASEAN member states, the forum has failed to
constrain the PRC in its advancements in the SCS.

According to one

analyst: “it remains uncertain whether the ASEAN members and China
will ever succeed to agree on a legally-binding code of conduct for
the South China Sea” (Emmers, 2002, 2).

If multilateral, economic
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organizations such as ASEAN are ineffective, elaboration on their
role in the SCS disputes is not necessary to describe the strategies
of the claimant states.

International law is a relevant factor in

the foreign policy formulation of all states mentioned in this paper.
However, the fundamental legal instrument, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has no enforcement
mechanism to bind its signatories.

As a result, the perception and

implementation of UNCLOS by the states mentioned in the text will be
discussed only when absolutely necessary.
Literature and Theory:
This paper will analyze the strategies of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Republic of
Singapore in response to the regional destabilization brought about
by the increasing capacity of the PLAN and the PRC's power projection
into the SCS, through international relations theoretical framework
of the realist paradigm.

As this paper will argue that diplomatic

efforts are secondary to the power-based strategies utilized by the
smaller states in the face of security threats, it should ensue that
the realist paradigm is the best lens through which to view the
disputes in the SCS.

The liberal framework, dealing with trade and

international norms and laws is relevant, and descriptions of
relations between states that are not military related will be
provided.

However, due to the failure of international norms, laws,

and trade as a means to prevent conflict, it will be shown through an
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analysis of recent history that the small states in the region have
not relied on liberal institutions to ensure regional stability and
their perceived nation interests.
The theoretical tradition of realism “depicts international
affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states” in an
anarchic international system, and is a valuable tool with which
international relations can be analyzed as it provides “powerful
explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to
cooperation, and other international phenomena” (Walt, 1998, 31).
Focusing on the changing structure of the international system in
East Asia over the last several decades, this paper will highlight
how these structural changes have influenced the behavior of these
states in the SCS.
The realist paradigm includes several competing theoretical
frameworks.

The frameworks most applicable to the SCS disputes are

structural and offensive realism.

John Mearsheimer has argued that

states in the international system “fear each other”, and “there is
little room for trust among states”.

Moreover, “[s]tates operating

in a self-help world”, that is, in an international system in which
the only assurance of state survival is a self-derived increase of
power, and the “ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system”
(Mearsheimer, 2001, 32-34).
Considering that the PRC is in a position with much more power
than its neighbors, external balancing is an ideal strategy for
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weaker states to prevent themselves from being overpowered.

As the

only states with the capacity to challenge the PRC militarily do not
exist within the region, the small states of Southeast Asia may look
to an “offshore balancer”, one with the ability to project their
power into the SCS, to protect their interests (Mearsheimer, 2001,
42).

However, in the realist paradigm states do not depend wholly on

balancing alliances.

“Alliances are only temporary marriages of

convenience... [s]tates operating in a self-help world almost always
act according to their own self-interests and do not subordinate
their interests to the interests of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2001,
33).

The uncertainty of external balancing must result in states

engaging in multifaceted strategies of external and internal
balancing, as well as engagement with the rising power in the system.
This form of strategy is known as hedging. (Roy, 2005, 305)
On the opposite end of the strategic spectrum, in the face of a
rising power a weaker state might choose to align with this state as
opposed to balancing it; this presents the dichotomy of bandwagoning
versus balancing, respectively. (Roy, 2005, 305)

During the period

of relative peace in East Asia after the late 1990s and leading up to
the economic depression which began with the crisis in 2008, some
scholars argued that bandwagoning was the standard reaction to the
PRC's increasing influence in the region.

One of the most staunch

critics of the application of realist theory to East Asia, and the
popular notion set forth by Aaron Friedberg, that the region is “ripe
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for rivalry” (Achary, 2003, 149), is David Kang.

Kang argued that

international relations theories, developed by Western institutions,
by Western scholars, which serve to analyze the history of Western
states, are inadequate in their capacity to analyze the relationships
among East Asian states.

Kang argued that “Asia has different

historical traditions, different geographic and political
realities... [t]hus... nation-states in Asia do not necessarily
function like states in the West” (Kang, 2003, 83-84).

In Kang's

perspective, “[h]istorically, it has been Chinese weakness that has
led to chaos in Asia... East Asian regional relations have
historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than
those in the West” (Kang, 2003, 66).

In essence, Kang argues that

because of the Confucian tradition of hierarchy in East Asia, the
smaller states will likely bandwagon with the PRC.

This paper, while

not attempting to refute the power of historical tradition and
cultural identity in East Asia, will argue that Kang's predictions
are wrong, due to the changing power structure which as been
occurring over the last five or so years coupled with the
relationships established by the great power politics of the 20th
century, videlicet, the US with the Singaporean and Filipino regimes
and the Russian Federation with the Hanoi regime.
Amitav Acharya adds to this refutation of Kang's thesis by
arguing that regional states are not bandwagoning, at least not by
the definition established by Stephan Walt, which “implies
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acquiescence to a rising power by a state threatened by it.”

Acharya

goes on to argue that those seeking to use trade interests between
the PRC and its weaker East Asian neighbors are confusing “economic
self-interest with bandwagoning”; moreover, “[t]here are good
economic reasons for East Asian state to pursue economic ties with
China, but these do not amount to deference” (Acharya, 2003, 151).
The final tenet of the realist paradigm with which to analyze
the disputes in the SCS is the conception of security dilemma.
Security dilemma expounds the circumstances under which “the measures
a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the
security of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2001, 36). This concept is
particularly applicable to the SCS issue as the rapid development of
the PRC's military capabilities provide a strong incentive for states
to react by increasing their defenses.
Methods and an Evaluation of Case Study Relevance:
By first analyzing the literature establishing the historical
context of relations among the states with interests in the SCS, this
paper will lay a foundation for exploring the most recent sequence of
events.

Drawing from primary and second sources, while also

exploiting literature authored by individuals of various
nationalities and from all levels of analysis, this paper aims to
achieve a balanced assessment of the motivations driving state
actors' diplomatic and military efforts.
As the topic of this paper focuses on the response of the
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Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Republic of the Philippines, and the
SPG, the actions taken by the relevant PRC institutions involved in
the SCS issue will be treated first, providing an empirical
background with which various theories of international relations can
be applied (i.e.
theory).

security dilemma theory and power transition

After providing an analysis of actions taken by the PRC

with regard to the SCS, individual case studies will be prepared,
detailing the motivations, actions and statements of the regional
powers.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam will be the first state
analyzed through an individual case study.

The Socialist Republic of

Vietnam was chosen for a case study as its history of territorial
disputes in the SCS with the PRC are of longest duration.
Additionally, the PRC had already been engaged in conflict with the
military forces commanded from Saigon in the SCS prior to the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam's defeat of the Republic of Vietnam and
subsequent control over all the territory and people once governed by
that regime.

As a consequence, the 1970s featured multiple

altercations between PRC and Vietmanese naval forces, and new
occupancies of some disputed islands.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is the only state with
territorial disputes in the SCS to have engaged in military conflict
with the PRC resulting in losses of territory and human life.

This

fact is significant in that Socialist Republic of Vietnam leadership
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can draw on this history in a variety of manners: expectations of the
PRC's resoluteness can be measured by past experience; expectation of
coercive response to any Socialist Republic of Vietnam claims, such
as the contracting of resource extraction rights, could change
behavior, especially considering the current disparity in military
capacity where the PLA is obviously better funded, technologically
superior, and greater in force size.

The Socialist Republic of

Vietnam can utilize historical narratives of PRC aggression in the
SCS to bolster support both internally and externally for any desired
policy position.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam case must be considered simply
because of the state's proximity to the PRC territory.

Beyond

sharing a land border, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam territory is
situated near Hainan Island, which is home to the PRC's Southernmost
naval outpost, and likely point of power projection into the SCS,
Yulin Naval Base.

More recently, the increase in PRC naval capacity

sets a precedent for what some scholars and practitioners worry is
the PRC's grand strategy for occupying and militarily fortifying
these islands for further power projection.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam case holds more substance in
that its leadership has advanced a multifaceted policy approach.

The

involvement of multiple great powers in the disputed territory of the
SCS, such as the US and the Republic of India, will be treated in
addition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's diplomatic
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relationship with the PRC and ASEAN.
The Republic of the Philippines will be the second state
analyzed through an individual case study.

As with the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam, proximity to and history of interaction with the
PRC render the Republic of the Philippines case study vital to
understanding how states with less capacity have dealt with the PRC
in the SCS.

Hainan Island is near the main Republic of the

Philippines island of Luzon, where approximately half of the Republic
of the Philippines's population resides and where the political
center, Manila, is located.

The overlapping claims began in 1972

when the Republic of the Philippines first initiated its formal
declaration of right to ownership of some features in the SCS by
organizing a portion of the claim, most of which is referred to as
the Kalayaans, under the management of the adjacent island province
of Palawan.
Only since the US military forces left the Republic of the
Philippines territory in 1992 have substantive challenges over the
disputes with the PRC began.

Since conflicts arose, the Republic of

the Philippines has allowed the return of US forces to its territory
and has publicly stated the importance of the US in its alleged
capacity to ensure stability in the region.
lends weight to the realist paradigm.

This unique circumstance

The poor relationship between

the PRC and the Republic of the Philippines has brought about the
most significant provocations in the SCS.

It can be argued that
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relations between the Beijing and Manila regimes are currently more
strained than with any other claimant states.
In addition to history and geographic proximity, the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of the Philippines claim island
formations that are believed to sit above oceanic crust containing
significant hydrocarbon reserves.

Fish stocks are also extracted

from this region by the fishing industries based in the four regional
states, the PRC, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of
the Philippines and the Republic of China (ROC).

The securing of

resources vital to the maintenance of growing economies is of obvious
importance to all claimants.
The Republic of Singapore will be the third and final state
analyzed through an individual case study.

This case analyzing in

conjunction with the others is necessary because the Republic of
Singapore's relationship to the issue of the stability in the SCS is
quite different from that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and
the Republic of the Philippines.

The Republic of Singapore is one of

few states in the region without claims to territory in the SCS.
Dependent on trade, regional stability and freedom of navigation are
the only priorities for the Republic of Singapore in this SCS issue.
To ensure these aims, the Republic of Singapore, like the
Republic of the Philippines, advocates for US leadership and naval
presence in the SCS.

In addition to this promotion, the US Navy's

Western Pacific Logistic Group has been based at the Republic of
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Singapore's Changi Naval Base, since 1992.

This entity provides

logistic support for the US Navy's Seventh Fleet.

The US Air Force

(USAF) is also enjoys a permanent presence in Republic of Singapore
territory.
The importance of the Republic of Singapore territory for
freedom of navigation and shipping security through the SCS cannot be
overstated.

The islands which constitute the Republic of Singapore

territory are positioned between the southernmost point of the Malay
Peninsula and islands controlled by the Republic of Indonesia,
separated by the Strait of Singapore.

The Strait of Singapore is a

key body of water, a potential choke-point, in shipping between the
Strait of Malacca and the SCS.

As much of the world's shipping

volume, including that of the industries based in the states in
question, passes through this corridor, understanding the role of the
Republic of Singapore in the SCS issue is essential.

The importance

of the Port of Singapore as a refueling and cargo transfer point is
also notable.

Moreover, its vital role in the shipping industry and

that the Republic of Singapore is willing to aid US military forces
in their capacity to project power into the SCS to a greater extent
than any other regional power further justifies its use as a case
study in discovering how relatively weaker states are responding to
the increasing presence of PRC power in the region.
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Organization:
Followed by this introductory chapter, this paper will contain
five additional chapters.

The four chapters to follow consist of

individual case studies.

These case studies provide the empirical

evidence necessary to support an analysis of the subject matter.

The

final chapter will consist of an analytical conclusion, drawing from
the evidence, an explanation of how these states of relatively less
capacity have managed with the increasing capacity and power
projection of the PRC.
The chronological format will be presented as follows:
•

Chapter One: Introduction

•

Chapter Two: A Case Study of the People's Republic of China

•

Chapter Three: A Case Study of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

•

Chapter Four: A Case Study of the Republic of the Philippines

•

Chapter Five: A Case Study of the Republic of Singapore

•

Chapter Six: Conclusion

•

Annotated Bibliography

•

Index of Key Words, Abbreviations and Acronyms
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Chapter Two: The Factors Involved in
the People's Republic of China's Territorial Claims
in the South China Sea

From the ROC to the PRC: Promoting Claims in the South China Sea
Due to the numerous domestic and international problems faced by
the Republic of China (ROC) administration, it was not until the
early 1930s that a formal assessment of the territorial boundaries,
which constituted the self-perceived land and water expanses to be
rightfully controlled by ROC state, was conducted.

Prior to this

point, most maps used by the ROC regime for international discourse
were antiquated or of foreign origin.

As the ROC leadership sought

to consolidate power and wrest control of fringe territories from
various entities with competing claims to the right of governance, it
was necessary to promulgate the exact territorial boundaries.

To

achieve this aim the administration created the Land and Water Maps
Inspection Committee. (Li & Li. 2003, 287-289)
With regard to the South China Sea (SCS), at the committee
meeting on 21 December 1934 the formal land claims were approved.
The precise location and names, in both the English and Chinese
language, of physical land bodies were issued.

The following month,

for the January 1935 issue of the committee's journal, the names and
coordinates of 132 physical land bodies were published; of the 132
bodies 28 were of the Paracel Island group (Xishā qúndǎo) and 96 of
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the Spratly Island group (Nánshā qúndǎo).

Later, the committee

published two maps designating 4º northern latitude as the southern
most extent of the regime's territorial claims in the SCS, extending
to James Shoal (Céng mǔ ànshā) of the Spratly Island group. (Li & Li.
2003, 289)
After the close of the Pacific War, Japanese Imperial forces
left the SCS allowing the ROC regime to regain possession of a
majority of its claims.

Reaffirming its claims in 1947, the

administration renamed many islands of the Spratly and Paracel groups
in a manner corresponding to their geographic location.

The Ministry

of Internal Affairs promoted measures to ensure international
recognition of ROC territorial claims, and authorized the government
of Guangdong Province to protect the state's interests in the SCS.
To promote their claims, the Ministry of Internal Affairs published
The Administrative Division Map of the Republic of China that
enclosed the Pratas Islands (Dōngshā Qúndǎo), the Paracel Islands
group, the Macclesfield Bank (Zhōngshā Qúndǎo), and the Spratly
Island group within an eleven-dash or “dotted” line.

According to an

official within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, “the dotted
national boundary line was drawn as the median line between China and
the adjacent states” (Li & Li. 2003, 289-290).
After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in
1949, all maps and relevant publications followed the position of the
previous regime with regard to territorial claims.

However, in 1953
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Premier Zhou Enlai reached an agreement with the existing Vietnamese
regime to remove two lines that ran through the Gulf of Tonkin.
Afterward, the nine-dotted line was published both for international
audiences as well as in all state-sponsored education texts.

(Li &

Li. 2003, 290)
In the following years, repeated proclamations by PRC officials,
state-sponsored media and educational authorities brought the issue
of sovereignty in the SCS to a prominent position in Chinese
political culture.

Despite competing historical claims by the

government in Hanoi, PRC officials were resolute in promoting their
claims as non-negotiable.

For example, in 1977, after conflicts

arose between SRV and PRC naval forces over the occupation of islands
in the Paracel group, Foreign Minister Huang Hua asserted: “[t]he
territory of China reaches as far south as the James Shoals, near
Malaysia’s Borneo territory... I remember that while I was still a
schoolboy, I read about those islands in the geography books. At that
time, I never heard anyone say those islands were not China’s... The
Vietnamese claim that the islands belong to them.
way.

Let them talk that

They have repeatedly asked us to negotiate with them on the

issue; we have always declined to do so... As to the ownership of the
islands, there are historical documents that can be verified. There
is no need for negotiations since they originally belonged to China.”
(Dutta, 2005, 273-274)
PRC leaders have been careful to frame their arguments in a
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manner consistent with domestic and international law.

The

historical claim to sovereignty is bolstered by the PRC constitution,
which states that the PRC, “stands for the development of state
relations between China and other countries on the basis of the five
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit...” (PRC, 1982).
The Role of International Law and of Norms:
International norms and laws challenge the PRC's claims to
sovereignty in the SCS.

The PRC's argument is that Chinese regimes

have occupied the islands since antiquity and thus the PRC has
inherited legitimate title.

The PRC leadership resents that

international law does not adequately accept historical claim
arguments.

However, while the norms and laws do not accept the PRC's

historical claims, there are some advantages for the PRC.

Also, the

law serves to promote a more aggressive policy by the PRC toward the
occupation of the disputed islands; such a policy would consist of
attempts to settle on unsettled features in the SCS and the display
of naval patrol in the areas where the PRC is currently in control.
In 1928, an early case of international arbitration between two
claimant states of island territory, the Island of Palmas Case
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States,
established an international norm for what constitutes effective
occupation of an island territory.

The Hague Court established that
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neither proximity nor historical claim constituted a legal right to
own territory.

To justly claim territory, the court ruled that a

party must have the capacity and intent to exercise control over the
territory in question.

(Roque, 2002, 437-448)

This recognized norm both benefits and challenges the PRC's
claims in the SCS.

The disregard of historical claims when

continuous control cannot be proven is to the detriment of PRC claims
in most cases; only in the Paracel Islands group, where the PRC
maintained effective control for several decades (Buszynski, 2012,
140).

The PRC has not had effective control over most of its

territorial claims in the SCS since the establishment of the dotted
line and the PRC in the late 1940s, but argues that since other
regional states did not protest the creation of the nine-dotted line,
international silence on this matter equates to acquiescence to PRC
claims (Li & Li. 2003, 290)

Regardless, this norm encourages the PRC

to increase its capacity to ensure jurisdiction over uncontrolled
features in the SCS that it deems to be sovereign territory.
Moreover, establishing effective control and consistent jurisdiction
would provide the RPC with a legal argument for its claims.
Beginning in the 1960s, the United Nations (UN) began
negotiations on what came to be known as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Rowan, 2005, 1).

UNCLOS was signed

in 1982 by the PRC and most relevant states, and then ratified in
1994.

Two major provisions of UNCLOS are relevant to the disputed
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territory in the SCS.

First, territorial waters extend outward from

a state's coast for 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers; 14 miles).

In

these territorial waters, the sovereign state exercises complete
control over all activity occurring within them, save the “innocent
passage” of foreign vessels (UN, 1982, 26-27).
The most important provision of UNCLOS with regard to the SCS
disputes is the establishment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

An

EEZ extends from a state's coast for 200 nautical miles (370
kilometers; 230 miles).

States have the right to access and

exploitation of all resources within their EEZ.

Hydrocarbon reserves

and fish stocks are pertinent examples of resources protected under
the EEZ provision. (UN, 1982, 40-41)
By this provision, the land features in the SCS gained new
potential for all claimant states.

Essentially, whichever state

enjoys legal claim to the island groups also enjoys the right to
exploit all resources extending from them via their EEZ.

By this it

is evident that UNCLOS increased the value of these islands to their
claimant states; this serves to exacerbate the dispute.

By providing

a legal umbrella under which states could extract two vital
resources, namely, hydrocarbons and fish stocks, the EEZ provision
increased the incentive for the PRC to establish jurisdiction over
its claims.
Economic Stability Through the Securing of Shipping and Resources:
In addition to the persistent trend of increasing population
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growth within the territory controlled by the PRC, since the reform
and opening policies (Gǎigé kāifàng) were established in the early
1980s, the Chinese have increased their consumption of resources
annually.

By converting the once inward-leaning, isolationist

economy into a dynamic outward-leaning economy, the aggregate output
in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) has steadily increased by
approximately 10% annually for nearly three decades.

Now dependent

on the import and export of numerous products (e.g. raw industrial
materials, capital goods, consumer goods, energy resources, and
agricultural commodities), the PRC leadership seeks to maintain its
perceived legitimacy by securing its capacity to import and export
freely, allowing economic growth to continue.

Access to and

extraction of domestic sources of energy is also a key component in
the government's calculations on continuous economic growth.
(Buszynski, 2012, 140-143)
To support its economic growth, the PRC has increasingly
advanced its consumption of energy resources, especially petroleum.
In the early years of dynamic economic growth, the PRC territory held
enough petroleum to allow for self-sufficiency.
1993 that PRC firms began importing crude oil.

It was not until
Despite being one of

the world's most prolific petroleum producers, along with
considerable state owned enterprise (SOE) efforts to increase rates
of extraction, demand has consistently exceeded supply.

By 2003,

aggregate consumption of petroleum within the PRC's territory was the
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second greatest by any population, surpassing Japanese levels and
trailing only American levels of consumption.

The PRC is the third

largest importer of petroleum, with more than 40% of its consumption
derived from imported crude in 2006. Some estimates project Chinese
consumption doubling by the year 2030, with imports increasing fivefold (Kreft, 2006, 109-110).

As demand for imported petroleum

increases, the International Energy Agency projects 80% of
consumption via imports by 2030.

If these projections are accurate,

the necessity of supply security becomes inescapable (IEA, 2004, 6667).
The PRC has been attempting to diversify its hydrocarbon sources
to meet this demand.

From recent extraction in the waters just

beyond the mouth of the Pearl River and near Hainan Island, the
expansion of offshore installations have reinvigorated old disputes,
namely, those between Japan and the PRC in the East China Sea
surrounding the Diaoyu Islands and those in the SCS.

After the

ratification of UNCLOS in 1994, the push for hydrocarbon extraction
in the waters surrounding the disputed territory in the SCS was
initiated by claimant states.

The estimated hydrocarbon resources in

the SCS vary by source; 213 billion barrels of oil have been
estimated by a Chinese firm in 1989(Saudi Arabia boasts the world's
largest petroleum reserves at 265 billion barrels) (Guo, 2013).
Moreover, if the PRC could secure its claims in the SCS, it would
potentially hold the most abundant petroleum reserves.

More
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importantly, claiming and exploiting these reserves would solve
concerns over access to petroleum, a vital ingredient fueling the PRC
economy.
However, with SRV and RP contracts already producing oil in the
SCS, the PRC has had to escalate its efforts to establish its claims.
By 1992, the SRV's offshore oil production was nearly twice the
volume as that of the PRC's; it is important to note that a
significant portion of the SRV's offshore oil production occurred in
the contested waters of the SCS.

PRC state officials and SOE

executives were openly concerned that the disparity between the
regional states and the PRC in developing oil resources in the SCS
would hamper economic growth.

Additionally, as the SRV and the RP

continued to explore and extract petroleum through the efforts of
domestic and foreign firms, some PRC leaders worried that these
international interests could jeopardize the physical capture of the
territories in the SCS (Dutta, 2005, 279-282).
Exacerbating energy related tensions in the SCS further, much of
the petroleum imported to the PRC and the rest of Northeast Asia
passes through the Strait of Malacca and then through the SCS; over
50% of imported petroleum is transported through these straits
(Kreft, 2006, 112).

This maritime choke-point is one of the most

significant concerns for the PRC, driving policy makers to act with
haste to ensure stability of the region through diplomatic means as
well as increases in the capacity for naval power projection in the
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SCS (Buszynski, 2012, 145).
Shipment of oil through the SCS is not the only transportation
concern for the PRC.

More than 30% of all commercial shipping passes

through the SCS, with most of it traveling between the Spratly
Islands.

For the PRC, the strategic advantages that would come along

controlling the Spratly Islands, and the SCS in general, are obvious:
among these are protection of commercial interests, potential for
military outposts, and bargaining power when dealing with states
dependent on shipping through the SCS.

It is for these reasons that

non-claimant states cite freedom of navigation as the chief concern
in the SCS issue (Weitz, 2011).
Fish stocks in the SCS are also playing a role in the PRC's
claims.

Historically as well as today, peoples of the region

consider marine protein a dietary necessity.

With dwindling stocks

in the PRC's inland water bodies as well as in the East China Sea and
the Yellow Sea, the need to secure access to the SCS stocks is
becoming more urgent.

Since 2005, the SRV claims that PRC patrol

boats have seized 63 fishing vessels, capturing hundreds of crew.
This is but one example of how the PRC is seeking to defend its claim
to the fishing resources near its island claims in the SCS
(Buszynski, 2012, 141-144).
While the insecure nature of resource demand and shipping
prompts the PRC to take action to secure its perceived interests, the
state cannot act with impunity, despite being the dominant military
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power of the region.

It is assumed that in the event of another

Taiwan crisis or some other military escalation between the US and
the PRC that the US Navy currently has the capacity to stop oil
imports from the Middle East by either ceasing shipment from the
source, where there are numerous US military installations to ensure
this, or by blockading the Straits of Malacca.

Blockading the

waterway between the Malay Peninsula and Island of Sumatra would not
only threaten a considerable portion of the energy supply of the PRC,
but also its ability to import and export in general, since much of
the PRC's trade flows through these straits.

Thus two necessary

approaches result: the PRC perceives that it must gain access to the
SCS oil deposits within the EEZ surrounding its territorial claims
for both immediate relief of demand but also for its long-term
economic growth; and the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) must
increase its presence in the SCS.

By expanding PLAN presence in the

SCS, the PRC can exhibit to the international community that it,
above all other claimants, has effective occupation of the disputed
territories while simultaneously increasing the security of its
access to the shipping lanes to and from the Indian Ocean via the
SCS.

The threat of piracy also spurs the expansion of PLAN capacity

in the region.
Regime Legitimacy:
The one-party system that is the PRC has delivered a mixed
history of policy success.

While repression of dissent, censorship
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and a network of public-opinion shaping campaigns play a role, in the
recent decades, it is arguable that economic growth and national
prestige are the key factors that keep domestic pressure from rising
to the point of revolution, or at least major reforms.

As these two

criteria are requisite to the maintenance of regime legitimacy,
solving the SCS issue has become ever more necessary.
As noted above, unfettered access to the resources contained
within and those being transported on the SCS are vital to the
continuous growth of the economy.

Controlling the SCS does more for

the regime than ensure its economic growth.
decisive role.

Nationalism plays a

It has been argued that modern Chinese nationalism is

grounded in the affirmation of historical memory, a state-promoted
history of “national humiliation,” an experience during which foreign
powers repeatedly took advantage of the militarily weaker regimes of
the Qing Dynasty and the ROC to the social and economic detriment of
the population.

One prominent feature of period between the mid-19th

century until after the Second World War was the seizure of territory
by foreign powers, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, occupied by the
United Kingdom and Imperial Japan, respectively.

The effect on

national prestige tends to create a sense of duty for the PRC regime
to assert is claims to territorial sovereignty, and even to regain
the so-called “lost territories.”
As one strategic analyst has put it, “[b]y attaching the
regime’s legitimacy to its ability to protect and defend Chinese
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sovereignty, the communist party leaders committed themselves to
holding firm on their claims on Taiwan, the South China Sea islands,
and other maritime territorial claims... Any Chinese leader, who
suggests independence for these areas or gives up ‘historical’
claims, risks being ostracised for surrendering the “sacred
motherland”. Having wrapped themselves in the flag, the regime’s
leaders find it difficult to compromise on the issue of territorial
integrity” (Dutta, 2005, 277-278).
Essentially, as a consequence of the combination of history and
regime rhetoric, the PRC must display strength in its approach toward
the SCS disputes to appease the nationalistic fervor from within,
while also being able to physically secure these claims to ensure
access to vital resources (Cronin, 2013).

It can only do so through

the establishment of international recognition, even if such
recognition is given begrudgingly, of the PRC's sovereignty and
military control over the SCS territories.

These two factors

ultimately determine the legitimacy of the ruling elite.
Increasing Control and Naval Capacity:
During the 1980s, PLAN Admiral Liu Huaqing dominated the debate
on the future of the PRC's capacity to project naval power.
often referred to as “China's Mahan” by foreign analysts.

Liu is
This label

is given as Liu advocated for steady build up of naval capacity with
an aim to control strategic islands, harbors, straits, lines of
communication, and other valuable assets, as did US Navy Admiral
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Alfred Mahan, in arguing that sea powers must to protect their coasts
by committing considerable resources to naval power projection.

To

secure future economic growth, Liu argued that the PRC must buildup
the PLAN so that it could possess the capacity to wrestle control of
the so-called “first island chain,” the islands from just South of
Japan through those in the SCS, from “foreign powers.”

Moreover,

because many of these islands were controlled by foreign military
powers, the islands in this 'chain' could act in concert as a barrier
to contain the PRC.

For naval advocates like Liu, controlling this

territory is necessary for the expansion of the PRC's outward-leaning
economy and the protection of its sovereignty more generally (Holmes,
Yoshihara, 2006, 81-83).
By 1992, the issue of access to and control of the first island
chain became an issue of debate within the National People's
Congress.

Budgetary allocations, especially to the PLAN, were given

in favor of ensuring development of oil fields and securing other
interests in the SCS.

During that government meeting, sovereignty

over the SCS was coded into domestic law, in the Law of the
Territorial Sea.

Reflecting Liu's sentiment and that of the regime's

attention to issues of sovereignty, at that year's congress, PLAN
Admiral Zhang Lianzhong stated: “We will never forget that China was
invaded several times by imperialist troops from the sea. The
nation’s suffering from lack of sea defence still remains fresh in
our minds; and the history should not repeat itself” (Dutta, 2005,
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280-281).
More recently, this sentiment is no longer discussed exclusively
among the PRC elite and defense scholars.

The intent of the PLAN,

and PRC leadership in general, toward maritime policy has been shared
through openly published government documents and state-owned media
sources.

Printed in multiple languages, a PRC defense white paper

was published in 2004 that served to highlight the mission of the PLA
in matters of international conflict and especially naval conflict.
The paper reported that efforts to increase the PLAN's fleet by both
number of ships and quality were underway.

The stated goal was to

increase the PLAN's capacity to such an extent that it could be
capable of “winning both command of the sea and command of the air”,
as the “PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding China's maritime
security and maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas
along with its maritime rights and interests” (PRC, 2004).
Since 2008, existing naval bases with access to the SCS, such as
the Yulin Naval Base on the Southern coast of Hainan Island, have
been receiving increasing funding and construction projects have
advanced their capacity.

Yulin Naval Base currently specializes in

supporting nuclear submarines; however, construction is underway to
allow it a capacity to dock aircraft carriers.

In June of 2009,

during an advisory meeting, PLA General Zhang Li promoted the
construction of an airbase and seaport at Mischief Reef (Měi jì
jiāo), an island of the Spratly group.

At a distant 1110 kilometers
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from Hainan Island, General Zhang advocated this plan as a means to
project power deep into the SCS, controlling the Spratly Island
group, and potentially increasing the range of the PLAN vessels so as
to bypass the Straits of Malacca (Hsiao, 2009, 1-2).

It should be

noted that this island was previously occupied by the RP until
shortly after the US military withdrawal; in 1994, the PLAN took
possession of Mischief Reef during monsoon season, when RP forces
regularly abandoned post (Dzurek, 1995, 67).
Echoing Admiral Liu's strategic vision, in recent years defense
practitioners have advocated for an “anti-access” strategy.

A lesson

learned from the US Navy's involvement during the 1995-96 Taiwan
Strait Crises led to the development of this unique asymmetrical
strategy.

In theory, the anti-access strategy consists of deploying

anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), particularly the model Dong
Feng 21D, capable of striking a moving target at a range greater than
1500 kilometers.

If stationed where capable PLA bases are currently

located, these ASBMs could prevent foreign ships from accessing the
waters beyond most of the first island chain, including Taiwan and
more than half of the SCS.

In essence, the purpose of the ASBMs,

also championed as “carrier killers,” an obvious reference to the US
Navy's favored vehicle of power projection, are to allow the PRC
access to its perceived territorial waters while denying the
interference of competing navies. (Erickson, 2009, 5-6).
The implications of the PRC's expansion of naval capacities into
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the SCS and that of the deployment of its ASBMs has been cause for
concern among regional powers and those with perceived interests in
the SCS.

These developments have been contemporaneous with the US's

“rebalancing” toward Asia. The US's renewed emphasis on its policy
toward Asia and Southeast Asia in particular has created further
concern within the PRC leadership to increase its security efforts
(Lee, 2012, 22).
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Chapter Three: A Case Study of the History and Strategy of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's in its Interactions with
the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea

The Conflict of Vietnamese State Regimes with the PRC in the SCS:
In the early 1970s, the two states competing for control over
the Vietnamese population each held their own distinct territories in
the SCS, although each regime claimed the Paracel Island Group and
the Spratly Archipelago.

The state based in Hanoi could not allocate

enough resources to physically occupy most of their claims; the
government in Saigon garrisoned some islands of the Spratly Island
Group and many of the Western portion of the Paracel Island Group,
often referred to as the Crescent Group. (Garver, 1992, 1001-1003)
Power politics complicated the disputes during this time as the
three great powers with forces deployed in Asia, the Soviet Union
(USSR), the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China
(PRC), sought a means to balance power in their favor.

Tensions

between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the PRC grew near the
end of the Indochina Wars following the rapprochement between the US
and the PRC in 1972.

Concerned that the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam would align itself with the USSR, the PRC leadership forecast
that the Hanoi government would allow Soviet naval expansion via the
islands in the SCS, further encircling the PRC.

As a consequence,

the PRC looked to capture the islands held by the weakening forces of
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the Saigon government to avoid the Socialist Republic of Vietnam from
recovering them after the seemingly inevitable fall of the Saigon
regime.

The Eastern portion of the Paracel Island Group, also known

as the Amphitrite Group, was under the control of the PRC already by
that time, with a significant military installation on Woody Island.
The ideal geographic circumstance and unlikelihood of significant
military resistance brought PRC leaders to conclude that capturing
the Crescent Group would come at little cost.

The slight cost of

controlling the entire Paracel Group coupled with its strategic
importance prompted the PRC to instigate an engagement by Saigon
forces. (Garver, 1992, 1003-1004)
That the chairman of the PRC's Central Military Commission, Deng
Xiaoping, personally oversaw the engagement speaks to how the Beijing
government perceived the strategic importance of the Paracel Group.
In late January 1974 the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) clashed
with Saigon forces throughout the Crescent Group, and after several
days of minor fighting, eventually forced the Saigon forces to
abandon the Paracels altogether.

However, only a year had passed

before the Saigon regime fell.

The Hanoi-based regime then moved to

control its claims in the SCS.

While the PRC had developed some

infrastructure on the newly captured territory, not all islands were
under the PRC's physical control.

Six islands of the Crescent Group

were seized and garrisoned by Hanoi forces in April of 1975.

This

effort to prevent the PRC from fully capturing the Paracel Island
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Group would provide a foothold for future bargaining over the
disputed islands, and would prove effective control.

The following

month, in May of 1975, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam published an
official map that featured the Paracel and Spratly groups as
exclusive Socialist Republic of Vietnam territory. (Garver, 1992,
1005)
The Hanoi regime publicly disputed PRC claims that both islands
groups had been Chinese territory since ancient times; instead, the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam promoted their own claim to historical
jurisdiction.

The SCS issue subsided for some time as Socialist

Republic of Vietnam relations with the PRC became further complicated
by the more important issue of Socialist Republic of Vietnam and USSR
collusion. (Garver, 1992, 1006)
From 1976 through 1978, leading up to the brief war between the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the PRC over interests in
Indochina, both states were heavily involved in reconnaissance and
surveying of both islands groups, and building infrastructure on
their possessions.

During and after the conclusion of the land

conflict, the opposing sides engaged in an international campaign,
amassing historical evidence to promote their position of sovereignty
over the Paracel and Spratly island groups.
did not cease after the war in early 1979.

Skirmishes in the SCS
Multiple incidents

occurred through 1982, typically featuring one party repelling the
surveying or fishing vessels of the other. (Garver, 1992, 1007-1008)
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From 1982 through 1987, there was relatively little conflict
between the two states as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was
heavily involved in its war with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

During

this time, the PRC continued to survey the SCS with increasing
emphasis on the Spratly Island Group.

In response, the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam began to occupy some Spratly features, while
beginning to increase naval exercises.

This escalation prompted the

PRC to publicly claim that Socialist Republic of Vietnam forces
illegally occupied over 20 Spratly features and were advancing to
expand their control.

It was not until PLAN vessels began patrolling

the waters surrounding previously uninhabited features of the Spratly
Island group that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and PRC forces
clashed again.

In 1988, at Johnson Reef, a small Spratly feature,

the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had planned to establish an
outpost, and upon attempted delivery of construction materials was
turned back by PLAN warships.

This escalation occurred, in part,

because both claimant states were concerned by intelligence
information that suggested the other would increase the extent of its
occupation during the following typhoon season. (Garver, 1992, 1007)
After a naval confrontation ended in favor of the PRC, the reef,
previously submerged during high tide, was transformed into an
artificial island with a support base and helipads. (Rowan, 2005, 6)
The unique historical experience of the Vietnamese regimes with
Chinese regimes, the PRC in particular, make it reasonable to

43
anticipate that the PRC will use force to manage disputes in the SCS.
Considering this reality in Hanoi-Beijing relations coupled with the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam military record of defeat against the
PRC in all previous altercations, any attempts to settle these
disputes would likely require external leverage.
The Oil Production Race:
After the hydrocarbon surveys published in the year 1989
estimated greater petroleum deposits in the SCS than all of the PRC's
onshore petroleum deposits combined, the territorial disputes
described above regained attention and conflict seemed imminent. This
was particularly because these deposits occurred mostly within the
EEZ of the Spratly Island Group. Perhaps as a response, by late 1989
Socialist Republic of Vietnam increased its naval presence and added
to its garrisons in the Spratly Island Group, and began offshore
petroleum extraction in the waters where it held control.

The PRC

leadership decided to cease militarily operations in the SCS in order
to propose a regional dialogue concerning the disputes.

Premier Li

Peng announced the possibility of jointly developing the Spratly
Island Group.

Many international analysts, including some

Vietnamese, saw this PRC policy shift as a short-term strategy to
ease tensions arising from two major setbacks: the fall of communist
regimes in Eastern Europe and the Tiananmen incident.

As this policy

shift coincided with these events, it seemed natural to skeptics that
the PRC sought to improve its international image.

(Garver, 1992,
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1015-1016) Partly as a result of the sudden position change by PRC
leaders, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam did not respond in favor
of the PRC proposal.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam did not

remove military forces as suggested by Premier Li, and the regime’s
extractive efforts intensified.

Additionally, rather than agreeing

to dialogue over joint development, Socialist Republic of Vietnam oil
production increased. (Oldgaard, 2003, 17)
By 1992, PRC leadership remarked how far along the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam had come in its petroleum production efforts.

At

that time, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's offshore oil
production was nearly double that of the PRC's (Dutta, 2006, 280).
International disputes were raised again later in the year 1992, as
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam publicly protested that the PRC had
begun extracting oil in the Gulf of Tokin.

While this did not lead

to military escalation, what amounted to a race to explore and
extract oil resources from the contested territory began.

The PRC

could utilize US-based firms to harvest oil, even within the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam's EEZ, with relatively little risk as
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was negotiating the lifting of a US
trade embargo and also wished to attract the assistance of US-based
firms.

Over the next few years, both the PRC and the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam were leasing drilling rights to several US-based
firms.

In addition to US-based firms, the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam's joint venture with the Moscow, VietSovPetro, was still
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functioning despite the regime change in Moscow. (Rowan, 2006, 5)
Increasing Militarily Capacity:
With the fall of the USSR, and the subsequent end of the
economic and military aid it had received from that regime in 1992,
the SRV had less capacity to protect its claims.

Further increasing

the power vacuum in the region in the PRC's favor, the US military
fully withdrew its forces from the Philippine Islands by mid-December
of 1992.

In response to these dramatic shocks in the regional power

structure, from 1994 through 1999 the SRV began a program to increase
its military capacity while simultaneously reaffirming relations with
the new regime in Moscow. (Tennesson, 2000, 204-205)
Purchasing equipment and arms from the Russian Federation was
the main means by which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam increased
its militarily capacity.

Twelve fighter jets, two naval vessels with

missile loads, a package of short-range surface-to-surface missiles,
several combat helicopters and four radar stations were purchased
during these years.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam also

contracted with the Russian Federation for assistance in constructing
two warships.

Some purchased were also made with the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the late 1990s. (Tennesson,
2000, 204-205)
Considering the power structure of Asia and the history of
disputes with the PRC, a chief motive for the Hanoi regime to
increase its military capacity was surely to respond to the sudden
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disparity in power.

Regardless of the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam's attempts to modernize its naval and air power, the PRC's
capacity to project power into the SCS was far greater.

Given that

the PRC economy is larger, growing with greater intensity, and
allocating more funds to its military, it is not feasible for the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam to compete in a modern arms race.
Therefore, it would constitute a poor strategy to internally balance
the PRC as the sole response.

The Hanoi government cannot be sure

that its interests in the SCS will be secure in the future without
complicating the disputes further by including the interests of other
powers, chiefly the US, the Republic of India and the Russian
Federation.

Moreover, by increasing military ties with powerful

states and entangling their petroleum industries with extraction
contracts within the disputed waters, the Hanoi regime has attained
some leverage over the PRC with regard to the territorial disputes.
International Law and Multilateral Organizations:
To ensure that its perceived national interests are protected
amid an increasingly powerful and assertive PRC, the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam has implemented a multifaceted hedging strategy.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam formally joined the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum in 1995, but
has seen the organization do little to establish means by which
associated states can hold one another accountable for actions taken
in the SCS (Emmers, 2002, 2).

Accordingly, the Socialist Republic of
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Vietnam has also sought to promote its interests within the context
of the UNCLOS.

As all states with coasts along the SCS have ratified

UNCLOS, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam assumes that this
convention may be valuable in establishing an international norm
applicable to its disputes in the SCS. (Tonnesson, 2000, 209-210)
Perceived Changes in the International Structure:
Despite nearly a decade during which the claimant states
cooperated in multilateral organizations like ASEAN and experienced
relatively little public dispute over claims in the SCS, in more
recent years, claimant states have spurred renewed interest in the
SCS issue.

As was the case after the USSR regime was dissolved in

the early 1990s, the uncertain position of the US and European
economies coupled with the increasing scale of the PRC's role in
regional trade at the time of the market panics in late 2008, changes
have occurred in the regional power structure.

This accounts for

much of the media and scholarly attention toward the future
implications of the PRC's increasing role in the international order,
and more acutely in the region.
Consequently, since the US and European market panic in 2008 and
subsequent economic depression as opposed to the relative stability
of the PRC economy, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has sought to
involve powerful states in its military affairs and resource
development in the SCS.

With more confident state officials in

Beijing, leaders in Hanoi have been compelled to react so as to
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prevent a deterioration of the currently profitable status quo in the
SCS.
The Strategy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the SCS
Disputes:
The current Vietnamese state regime can draw from a short but
significant history of strained relations with the PRC, especially
with regard to territorial disputes.

These experiences have taught

the leadership in Hanoi that the PRC is willing to use force to
settle disputes when it benefits them to do so.

The past several

years have brought about a rekindled interest in the SCS disputes,
and therefore the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as a relatively
weaker state, must develop an asymmetric strategy to deter the PRC
from using force to alter the status quo in the SCS.

In attempting

to achieve this end, the Hanoi regime has developed a multifaceted
strategy consisting of internal balancing through an increase in
military spending, interest-focused trade relations and external
balancing.

Hanoi has created an interest for several powerful states

in a peaceful settlement or the maintenance of status quo in the SCS.
This has occurred due to cooperation between Hanoi's state-owned
firms and those of other states with regard to hydrocarbon
exploration and exploitation, resulting in the establishment of an
additional economic incentive for supra-regional states to encourage
peace in the SCS.

Hanoi has also developed military ties with great

powers, mainly the US and the Russian Federation.
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As mentioned before, since the mid 1990s, through oil production
contracts with US-based firms and with Moscow via the joint venture,
VietSovPetro, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has encouraged two
great military and economic powers to invest their energy-related
interests in the maintenance of status quo in the SCS.

More

recently, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has involved the Republic
of India through a joint petroleum venture with an Indian state-owned
enterprise, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC).

On 03

December, 2012, the Indian Navy Chief Admiral D.K Joshi remarked on
the SCS disputes and the New Delhi regime's interest by asserting:
“Not that we expect to be in those waters very frequently, but when
the requirement is there for situations where the country's interests
are involved, for example ONGC Videsh, we will be required to go
there and we are prepared for that” (Keck, 2012.)
In addition to promoting the involvement of great powers through
their interests in securing energy, the SRV has increased military
ties with other states as well.

Even before 2008, civil and military

leaders representing the US and SRV visited each others’ state
capital regularly.

On several occasions, US Navy warships have met a

port of call at Ho Chi Minh City and other port cities controlled by
the SRV.

In 2009, the US began selling “non-lethal” military

equipment to the SRV, and began negotiations concerning the joint
development of a civilian nuclear program the following year (Weitz,
2011).

Since 2010, the US and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam have
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conducted joint naval exercises.

By the end of that year, the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam invited foreign navies to use the Cam
Ranh Bay Naval Base for peaceful purposes (Weitz, 2011).
While the Russian Navy continued good relations with the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam after the collapse of the USSR,
military cooperation between the Russian federal government and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam has increased in this last decade.

In

late 2012, these two states began talks to establish a “material and
technical support station” in Cam Ranh Bay.

As cooperating with the

US may serve to agitate the PRC, because the PRC perceives the US as
its most significant external threat, working with the Russian
Federation provides the Hanoi regime with leverage in the SCS dispute
without instigating a relatively stronger response from Beijing (Li,
2012).
Moreover, it is clear that the SRV does not seek to balance the
PRC's power projection solely by forming good relations with the US
and its military.

The Russian Federation and the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam are expected to continue to foster relations, while the
SRV has extended an open-ended-invitation to other navies to increase
their ties with it.
Officials in Hanoi deny seeking an alliance with the US, but the
historical ties between the regimes in Moscow and Hanoi justify
current relations between the two states.

Further aiming to appear

non-aligned, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is not cooperating
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with powerful states to the exclusion of the PRC.

Over the past

decade, military-to-military talks occur between the two states and
joint military exercises have occurred. (Weitz, 2011)
The PRC, the US and the Russian Federation are the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam's greatest trading partners (EC, 2012, 4)

For

trade reasons alone, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would not
benefit from the outbreak of conflict with the PRC over the disputed
territories in the SCS.

For this reason, the Socialist Republic of

Vietnam has produced a multifaceted hedging strategy in its response
to the advancing military capacity of the PRC.

The Socialist

Republic of Vietnam cooperates militarily with the three most highly
funded militaries (i.e. the US, the PRC, and the Russian Federation).
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam's trade with two other great
military powers (i.e. the State of Japan and the Republic of India)
has increased over time.

The Vietnamese state has also been

successful with its attempts to increase the extent to which nonclaimant states, namely the ROI, the US and the Russian Federation,
have become invested in the energy resources deposited beneath the
disputed territories.

In essence, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

has managed to maintain formally good relations with the PRC while
simultaneously balancing its power projection in a few distinct ways.
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Chapter Four: A Case Study of the History and Strategy of
the Republic of the Philippines in its Interactions with
the People's Republic of China in the South China Sea

The Republic of the Philippines: Early Claims in the SCS
As the Spratly Group was abandoned by all states and firms with
claim after the Second World War, a Filipino businessperson settled
eight of the Westernmost features in 1947.

As a result of the San

Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, which forced the State of Japan
to renounce ownership of its claims in the SCS, the private ownership
of these features by this Filipino national became recognized by an
international forum (Thang, Thao, 2012).

By 1971, the president of

the Republic of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, declared the eight
Western features of the Spratly group as sovereign state territory.
Shortly after, the state issued hydrocarbon drilling rights in the
region and began plans for infrastructural development.

In 1974, the

eight Spratly features; Nanshan, Flat, West York, Northeast Cay,
Thitu, Lankiam Cay, Loaita, and Commodore Reef, were deeded to the
state. (Rowan, 2005, 3)
It was not until 11 June 1978, via Presidential Decree 1596,
that legislation was passed coding the Western Spratly group features
into domestic law.

This decree established that the Republic of the

Philippines claims the features' surfaces, seabed, subsoil, airspace,
and the continental margin of the group.

The regime had improved its
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claims by building shelter for fishing crews who port in the area,
constructing an airstrip on Thitu Island, and, most importantly,
reiterating its claims during its signing of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

In addition to the

islands fully controlled by Manila's forces, the majority of the
Western Spratly Island Group was also claimed.

To Filipinos, the

Western section of the Spratly Island Group, that amount to about
fifty separate features, are known as the Kalayaans.

(Storey, 1999,

96)
UNCLOS
UNCLOS and its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) provision provides
the Republic of the Philippines with legal jurisdiction over much of
the Western Spratly group and other claims in the Northern region of
the SCS.

Consequently, signing of the UNCLOS would give legal

security to what were mostly geographic features already occupied by
Filipinos and state forces.

While there was little confrontation

between the rulers in Beijing and Manila during the 1980s, their
overlapping claims in the SCS would develop into a more pronounced
dispute as the 1990s progressed. (Rowan, 2005, 3-4)
Joint Development and Good Relations
Save the experience of the Hanoi regime, throughout the 1980s
there had been virtually no notable developments between claimant
states.

This is particularly true with regard to relations between

the PRC and the Republic of the Philippines.

In April of 1988,
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President Corazon Aquino visited Beijing to meet with PRC officials
on economic issues.

While there Aquino discussed with the PRC's

paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, the topic of sovereignty over the
Kalayaans.

The two heads of state agreed to put aside the issue of

sovereignty, as the PRC also claimed the Kalayaans by claiming all
features of the Spratly Archipelago.

In additional to leaving the

issue of sovereignty to be handled peacefully at a later date, Aquino
and Deng publicly agreed to engage in the joint development of both
hydrocarbon reserves and management of fish stocks in the Spratly
region. (Storey, 1999, 96-97)
The Departure of US Forces:
There has been a constant US military presence in and around the
Philippine islands

since the late colonial era.

Immediately after

formal independence from the US in 1947, the Republic of the
Philippines established the Military Bases Agreement which allowed
the US military to continue operations of their Philippine base
installments.

The two major US bases were Clark Air Force Base and

Subic Bay Naval Base.

Along with bases on the islands of Okinawa and

Guam, the Philippine bases were a significant feature of the US
military grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold
War era.

Beyond supporting US military power projection, the bases

provided external security for the Republic of the Philippines,
allowing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to focus their
efforts on internal security issues.

In 1951, the two states signed
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the Mutual Defense Treaty, which is still in force to this date.
(Storey, 1999, 102)
Events in the early 1990s dramatically changed the nature of the
US military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and most pronounced in the
Philippines.

The changes in the international structure brought

about by the fall of the Soviet Union led to a decreasing interest
among US policy makers in allocating funds for the maintenance of
some strategic Cold War projects.

Among the population controlled by

the Philippine state, resentment toward the US military presence grew
to such an extent that in September of 1991, the state terminated the
US lease of all bases.

Earlier that year, the eruption of Mount

Pinatubo rendered Clark Air Force Base unusable.

Moreover, anti-US

sentiment within the Philippines coupled with a lack of resources
resulted in the complete withdrawal of all US military forces by the
end of 1992.

The power vacuum created by US force withdrawal was

exacerbated by AFP budget cuts in the late 1980s. (Storey, 1999, 103)
The ASEAN Forum and PRC Domestic Law:
The year of 1992 was very eventful in the arena of SCS disputes.
In February, the PRC passed the Law of the Territorial Sea, which
established the PRC's claims to the territory within the SCS into
domestic law.

For the Republic of the Philippines and other claimant

states, this PRC domestic law was provocative.

Moreover, as the

Republic of the Philippines and the PRC has proposed to shelve the
sovereignty issue, this move could have been interpreted as a
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betrayal of that agreement.

In part as a response to this and as the

conclusion of a general trend in multilateral efforts, some claimant
states through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
signed the Declaration on the South China Sea nearly six months
later. (Dutta, 2005, 282-284)
Foreign representatives from six Southeast Asian states,
including the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Declaration on
the South China Sea in July of 1992.

The ASEAN member states sought

to create a norm of behavior as each recognized that, “South China
Sea issues involve sensitive questions of sovereignty and
jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned”, and hence all state
signatories pledged to, “[emphasize] the necessity to resolve all
sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China
Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force... [urge] all parties
concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive
climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes” (ASEAN, 1992.)
Dispute Developments in the 1990s
In May of 1994, the Philippine Department of Energy granted a
contract to the Manila-based Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals and a USbased firm for exploration of the seabed southwest of Reed Bank, a
feature of the Spratly Archipelago..

Upon learning of the project,

PRC foreign ministers objected to the exploration as an intrusion of
PRC sovereignty and a violation of the joint exploration agreements
reached in 1988.

After the PRC's protests, the brokers of the joint
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venture offered an invitation to PRC state oil companies to become
partner; Beijing declined. (Dutta, 2005, 283)
As the exploration project may have appeared to be the initial
step in a unilateral attempt to exploit the hydrocarbons in the
region, the PRC deployed a surveillance mission.

It was discovered

months later by a Filipino fishing crew that the PRC established an
outpost on a previously unoccupied feature of the Spratly Archipelago
called Mischief Reef.

Despite being well within the Republic of the

Philippine's EEZ, it has been argued that the leadership in Beijing
felt compelled to occupy an island in the middle of Manila's claims
so that PRC interests could be better assured. (Dutta, 2005, 283)
The official PRC position on the occupation of Mischief Reef
asserts that structures built on this feature are there to provide
shelter for Chinese commercial fishing crews.

However, it was the

detention of a Filipino fishing crew near Mischief Reef by PRC forces
which first brought Manila to recognize the occupation.

After the

return of the fishing crew, Manila-commissioned reconnaissance
aircraft observed the construction of bunkers and satellite equipment
on Mischief Reef, infrastructure which does not align with the PRC's
claim of use.

Additionally, the reconnaissance mission spotted eight

PLAN vessels paroling the waters around Mischief Reef.

In response

to this, the Republic of the Philippines' president Fidel Ramos
protested that the occupation and use of Mischief Reed was:
“inconsistent with international law and the spirit and content of
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the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea to which
both [the PRC and the Republic of the Philippines] are parties”
(Storey, 1999, 97).
Having no capacity for military recourse against a more capable
PLAN force, the Republic of the Philippines sought diplomatic dispute
resolution with the PRC after discovering the Mischief Reef
occupation.

Both through the ASEAN meeting in Hangzhou in April of

1995 and through bilateral diplomatic talks, the state leadership in
Beijing and Manila established a code of conduct by August of that
year aiming to prevent further escalation. (Storey, 1999, 97)
At the same time Manila was engaging the PRC diplomatically, the
state apparatus was passing legislation to increase its military
capacity; the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines passed the
AFP Modernization Act in February of 1995.

This increase in military

spending and planning occurred while state practitioners and scholars
simultaneously engaged in debate over its relationship with the US.
(Cruz De Castro, 2012, 68)
Diplomatic efforts failed only months after their conclusion; in
January of 1996, Philippine Navy (PN) forces engaged with what were
reported as PLAN warships in a brief fire exchange near Campones
Island, an undisputed island near the main Philippine islands of
Luzon.

PLAN officials did not confirm these reports.

More minor

conflicts arose in 1997 and 1998, as Filipino fishing vessels were
reportedly confronted by PLAN vessels near Scarborough Shoal
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(Huángyán Dǎo), another disputed island not of the Spratly
Archipelago. (Rowan, 2005, 3)
In addition to conflict, the Republic of the Philippines'
intelligence sources claim that during the late 1990s the PRC
advanced in their infrastructural developments on Mischief Reef.
Philippine intelligence reported observing multistory buildings
equipped with anti-aircraft guns, with rooftops purported to be have
the capacity to serve as helipads.

That these developments were in

contrast to previous PRC statements concerning the island
infrastructure's use and contrary to the various agreements for
peaceful resolution caused much concern among Filipino scholars and
state practitioners. (Rowan, 2005, 3)

The official PRC position,

which was not accepted by the state leadership in Manila, was that
these installments on Mischief Reef and the aggressive tactics in
general were carried out by low-ranking, nationalistic individuals
within the PLAN “without the knowledge and consent of the Chinese
government” (Storey, 1999, 100).
Recent Dispute Developments:
Since 2008, the Republic of the Philippines have officially
reported seven separate confrontations between either PLAN forces or
Chinese fishing vessels in the disputed territory of the SCS.

For

example: 02 March 2011, two PLAN vessels allegedly harassed a Manilacommissioned hydrocarbon exploration ship West of Palawan Island.
The following month, the Republic of the Philippines issued a
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complaint to the UN concerning the issue.

Foreign ministers from

Manila also sought to develop consensus within and support from ASEAN
on the matter.

Days after the Republic of the Philippines engaged in

this multilateral dialogue with ASEAN members to promote a consesus
concerning the escalating dispute, the Maritime Safety Administration
of the PRC (CMSA) deployed their largest vessel to patrol the area,
and Manila responded by confronting the CMSA vessel with a Philippine
Navy destroyer. (Buszynski, 2012, 141-142)
While not escalating to the point of an exchange of fire, the
Spratly region and Scarborough Shoal disputes which have taken place
over the last five years have caused a dramatic diplomatic row
between the two states.

It seems that neither state is willing to

act upon their strong rhetoric and threats of force.

However, by May

of 2012 PRC officials have begun to formulate economic sanctions.

In

the PRC leadership's cost-benefit analysis, ceasing imports of fruit
grown on the Philippine islands coupled with banning the travel of
Chinese tourists to the islands would be more suitable than military
intervention. (Ambrosia, 2012)
The Republic of the Philippines' Focus on SCS Resources:
These recent disputes

come, in part, as a reaction by the PRC

to the increasing focus of the Philippine state on the resources
within the disputed territory.

Manila announced that it would offer

fifteen hydrocarbon exploration contracts to foreign firms; the area
to be explored is west of Palawan Island, into waters claimed by both
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states.

These contracts were part of a strategy to fulfill a

domestic oil production target set by officials in Manila, the target
being 60% of oil demand to be met by domestic production by 2011.
(Buszynski, 2012, 143)
As many of the clashes between the forces of the PRC, the
Republic of the Philippines, or private entities based in those
territories have involved fishing crews, the dispute over access to
fish stocks has become an increasingly important issue, due in part
to the significance of this resource to the populations of the
claimant states.

Zhang Hongzhou of the S. Rajartnam School of

International Studies argues that “The root causes of fishing
disputes between China and other countries are China’s worsening
supply and demand imbalances for aquatic products, and overcapacity
of its marine catch sector” (Zhang, 2012, 20).

This pressure has led

the PRC to subsidize fishing in areas far off the PRC shores, such as
near the Spratly Archipelago.

The PRC state-sponsored fishing places

further strain on the dispute between the two states, as the
population under Manila's rule is also producing a demand for marine
protein that is outstripping the available supply. (Beng, 2012)
The Strategy of the Republic of the Philippines in the SCS Disputes:
The perceived interests of the Republic of the Philippines in
the SCS are clear.

Access to what may be vast hydrocarbon resources,

the harvesting of fish stocks and the maintenance of territorial
integrity are the chief concerns when faced with opposition to claims
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by the PRC.

Attempting to settle the dispute between the two states

peacefully has not resulted in any notable benefit for the Republic
of the Philippines.

As a consequence, it can be argued that Manila

seeks to assert its claim with relevant international law and through
a combination of internal and external balancing.
Fortunately for the Republic of the Philippines, most of the
substantial features of the SCS that it claims, such as Reed Reef and
Commodore Reef of the Kalayaans, are currently controlled by Manila
or a sub-state administration, often the Provincial Government of
Palawan.

That the Republic of the Philippines can demonstrate

effective control over many of its claims gives significant weight to
those claims among the international community of states.
In addition to effective control, most of the SCS claims of the
Republic of the Philippines are supported by the UNCLOS EEZ
provision.

The 200-nautical mile EEZ reaches beyond the majority of

its claims.

Palawan Island provides the Republic of the Philippines

with an EEZ extending into the Spratly Archipelago, covering most of
Manila's claims.
Scarborough Shoal.

The island of Luzon is within 200-nautical miles of
Moreover, while the PRC's claims are mostly based

on its unique interpretation of history with some effective control,
the Republic of the Philippines enjoys more support from
international law.
As has been historically true, the close alliance with the US
still provides a security umbrella for the Republic of the
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Philippines.

Despite, the closing of US bases in 1991, the two

states continue to uphold their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

In

addition to this legal commitment to mutual defense, since 2002 the
US military has stationed a force of 600 troops to train and assist
the AFP.

Several thousand troops from both the US military and the

AFP participate annually in war games on the islands of Palawan and
Luzon, the two islands nearest to the territorial disputes in the
SCS. (Mcindoe, 2012)
The military alliance between the US and the Republic of the
Philippines allows Manila to balance PRC power projection.

However,

this balancing is imperfect due to the US interpretation of the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty.

The treaty reads “an armed attack on either

of the Parties [the US and the Republic of the Philippines] is deemed
to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of
the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in
the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
Pacific.”

The Philippine state's leaders have petitioned to the US

that the Kalayaan's and other disputed territories be included under
the treaty.

However, these efforts have failed as the US rebuttal

notes that Manila was deeded the Kalayaans after the signing of the
Mutual Defense Treaty. (Dzurek, 1995, 68)

In essence, only cases of

PRC aggression against the Philippine Navy's ships or Filipino
commercial vessels would trigger US military intervention.
As the disputed islands are not protected under the Mutual
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Defense Treaty, the Republic of the Philippines has been allocating
an increasing amount of resources to the advancement and
modernization of its navy.

The internal balancing efforts began with

the AFP Modernization Act, passed in 1995.

Section 3 of the document

states: “[o]bjectives of the AFP Modernization Program. — The AFP
modernization program shall be implemented in accordance with the
following objectives: (a) To develop its capability to uphold the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic and to secure
the national territory from all forms of intrusion and encroachment;
(b) To develop its capability to assist civilian agencies in the
preservation of the national patrimony, including the country's
living and nonliving marine, submarine, mineral, forest and other
natural resources located within its territory and its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ)...” (Senado ng Pilipinas, 1995).

A clear

reference to matters pertaining to the SCS disputes, the document
promotes increasing the AFP's capacity to protect the state's EEZ and
all resources contained within.
More recently, in 2011 a spokesman for the AFP, BrigadierGeneral Jose Mabanta, publicly announced the purchase of a US-made
Hamilton-class cutter.

This vessel has been deployed specifically to

patrol the waters around Spratly Archipelago.

By the end of 2013,

the Philippine Navy will receive two more retrofitted Hamilton-class
cutters. (AFT, 2011) Recognizing that the Philippine Navy, having few
large vessels, had not been able to operate effectively in the region

65
where it was needed the most, Rear Admiral Jose Luis Alano said “the
country has no choice but to acquire ships like the US Coast Guard’s
Hamilton-class cutters because of seasonal changes in the South China
Sea that make it treacherous to smaller vessels about half of the
time each year” (Jaleco, 2012).
In August of 2012, the Republic of the Philippines began
dialogue for the purchase of two large, anti-submarine frigates from
the Italian Navy.

Acquiring aircraft which can be deployed to the

SCS is also a focus in Manila's modernization efforts; contracts for
ten attack helicopters and multi-role fighter jets have been
negotiated.

In late 2012, commenting on the purchase of aircraft a

spokesperson for the AFP stated: “We are also looking at other
options for the lead-in but to be specific, based on our assessment,
it is the T-50 of South Korea that is most advantageous to us in
consideration to the obtaining situation in the West Philippine Sea
[SCS] and what is affordable to us.” (ABS-SBNnews, 2012)
Conclusion:
The disputes over claims in the SCS between the Beijing and
Manila regimes have escalated recently due to the increasing
importance of the resources located within the region.

Historically

there is little evidence that bilateral agreements concerning the
territorial disputes between the two states will result in a
resolution; neither has pressure from multilateral organizations like
ASEAN done much to constrain the stronger state-actor.

Consequently,
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the Republic of the Philippines is employing a strategy of balancing
and promotion of international law pertaining to territorial waters.
The EEZ provision of UNCLOS provides the Philippine state with a
legal bases for the exploitation of both fish stocks and hydrocarbon
deposits in the majority of its claimed waters.

The international

norm of effective control and jurisdiction is also in the Manila
regime’s favor.

As much of Manila's claimed territories in the SCS

are currently under its control, holding that position would provide
both a strong argument under international law and a strong position
vis-a-vis the attempts of another entity in the acquisition of
territory or access to resources.

For the maintenance of effective

control, the Philippine Navy is in the process of modernization to
expand its capacity to deter any incursions by PLAN forces or wellfunded Chinese fishing crews.

While the alliance with the US allows

for relatively more security, it is clear that the internal balancing
efforts taken by the Republic of the Philippines have included
funding and modernizing the AFP to increase its capacity for
protecting the external areas not included in the US treaty, namely,
protecting Manila's claims in the SCS.
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Chapter Five: A Case Study of the History and Strategy of
the Republic of Singapore in its Interactions with
the Conflicts in the South China Sea

The Republic of Singapore and Perceptions of Security:
The Republic of Singapore is a micro-state consisting of
several islands at the Southernmost point of the Malay Peninsula.
Historically, security has been a chief concern, and as a
consequence the leaders of the Republic of Singapore have promoted
the presence of the United States (US) military in the region as a
hedge against regional powers.

Despite this defense relationship

and significant trade with the US over the decades, the island
state has resisted aligning too heavily with any other state,
including the People's Republic of China (PRC), which is also
significant considering the ethnic demographics of the Republic of
Singapore; over 70% of the population is ethnically Han Chinese.
(Klingler-Vidra, 2012, 67)
Regardless of the rulers' desire to remain neutral, or
unaligned, potential conflict could dramatically upset the
outward-leaning Singaporean economy.

Dependent on maritime

shipping, the Republic of Singapore is especially vulnerable to
any disruption regional conflict could cause.

As the disputes in

the South China Sea (SCS) are arguably one of the most likely
causes for conflict in the region, Singaporean rulers are
concerned about its capacity to seriously disrupt trade.

In the

year 2000, a defense paper was published by the Republic of
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Singapore which stated: “In the 21st Century, Singapore’s peace
and prosperity will be more inextricably linked to that of the
region... an unstable regional environment will not only set back
our efforts to be a regional and global hub, but will also drive
away investors” (Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 2000, 6).
The defense paper goes on to note that, “unresolved
territorial and boundary issues in the Asia-Pacific region that
could lead to conflict...the Spratly Islands, which are claimed
wholly or in part by six parties... if not managed well, could
escalate and have adverse consequences for regional stability.”
Exacerbating this potential conflict further, the paper explains
that, “the competition for resources is likely to grow sharper as
Asia-Pacific economic growth regains momentum. Resource scarcities
could trigger future conflicts over access to or ownership of
vital resources such as oil, energy, water and maritime
resources.” (Ministry of Defence (Singapore), 2000, 8)
While the Republic of Singapore already possesses the world's
second busiest shipping port, as the economic climate in the
region continues to improve, the shipping volume of goods and
resources will only increase.

With relatively no natural

resources of its own, save its population and particular
geographic circumstances that have made it an ideal trade hub and
exporter of advanced consumer goods, the very survival of the
Republic of Singapore is contingent on the unimpeded flow of
shipping to and from its ports. (Chanlett-Avery, 2011, 2)
The Conundrum of Conflict Over Features in the SCS
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The Republic of Singapore is not a claimant state with regard
to the disputed territories in the SCS.

Regardless, as the

details above argue, the Singaporean stake in the peaceful
resolution of disputes, or at least a continuation of the status
quo, is quite high.

Located at the easternmost point of the

Straits of Malacca, a vital point of access to and from the SCS,
the role that the Republic of Singapore's geographic circumstances
would play in the event of conflict is taken into consideration by
supra-regional powers.

In a report on potential confrontation

between US and PRC military forces centered on the Straits of
Malacca, US Air Force (USAF) Major Lawrence Spinetta cited the
advantages of utilizing the Singaporean ports and airstrips: “From
a tactical perspective, Singapore is an ideal location” (Spinetta,
2006, 85).

As a result of its vulnerability to disruptions in the

flow of goods that would occur during times of conflict, coupled
with the strategic advantages a great power could procure from a
military relationship, the Republic of Singapore cannot help but
be involved with the disputes in the SCS.
US-Singaporean Military Relations:
The Republic of Singapore maintained good relations with the
US both in terms of trade and military ties during the Cold War.
However, after the Soviet regime dissolved and the US military
withdrew from the Philippine islands, Singaporean rulers were
concerned with power vacuum that was created.

In response to the

changing international structure, Singaporean Air Force Brigadier
General, Bey Soo Khiang remarked: “The reduction of the American
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military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is likely to be
destabilizing... We will then have a region fraught with potential
for a competition for influence.

To avert becoming another

Kuwait, or suffering the tragedy of being bullied by a bigger and
stronger power, countries will attempt to strengthen their
national resilience”(Gallagher, 1994, 173)
More recently, in July of 2005 US President George W. Bush and
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong established the
Strategic Framework Agreement.

This agreement, in addition to

setting foundations for counter-terrorism initiatives, updated an
earlier agreement between the two states, known as the Memorandum
of Understanding.

This partnership is part of the US military's

places-not-bases strategy.

In this context, places-not-bases

constitutes a pseudo-military alliance in which the US military
can access Singaporean facilities, thus negating the need for
formal bases.

In place since the year 1990, the Memorandum of

Understanding assisted in the transition of US military forces in
the post-Cold War Southeast Asian order. (Chanlett-Avery, 2011, 5)
The closing of the Subic Bay naval base increased the
intensity of US Navy deployment to Singaporean ports in a
rotational order.

Once located at Subic Bay, the Commander,

Logistics Group Western Pacific (CLWP) was relocated to Changi
Naval Base in Singapore.

CLWP is the logistic command and repair

facility for the US Navy's Seventh Fleet, the fleet which patrols
East Asia.

This fleet is significant in that it would be the

first to respond to any conflict in the region, as was the case in
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Taiwan Strait Crises in 1996.

In addition to servicing the US

Navy's Seventh Fleet, since the year 1999 the Changi Naval Base
has responded to port calls by nearly one-hundred US Navy vessels
annually.

By the year 2006, this Singaporean naval base had the

capacity to dock the US Navy's largest aircraft carriers; Changi
Naval Base is the only port in the region able to host US Navy
aircraft carriers. (Chanlett-Avery, 2011, 5)
Most recently, a reaffirmation of ties between the US and the
Republic of Singapore occurred during Defense Minister Ng Eng
Hen's visit to the Pentagon in April of 2012.

During this meeting

between Ng and US defense officials, the success of the Strategic
Framework Agreement of 2005 was noted, and dialogue concerning the
strengthening of this agreement contained plans for more joint
military exercises and the potential for a permanent deployment of
four US Navy combat vessels at Changi Naval Base. (AsiaOne, 2012)
Other Military Relations:
While the US has been and remains the primary security partner
of the Republic of Singapore, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)
have been involved in military exercises with the forces of other
states from the East Asia, including the PRC.

Since 1971, the

Republic of Singapore has been involved in the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA), which are a series of bilateral agreements
between the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Australia, New
Zealand, and Malaysia.

The FPDA requires the signatories to begin

consultations under the circumstances of aggression or significant
threat against Malaysia or the Republic of Singapore. (Gallagher,

72

1994, 181-182)
Trade and Diplomacy:
As a small state with a scarce supply of natural resources,
the Republic of Singapore has engaged extensively in foreign trade
relations.

Singaporean rulers choose to diversify their trade

relationships so as to avoid dependence on any state, especially
the largest states such as the US and the PRC for with whom trade
percentages are balanced near 10% of overall trade.

The Republic

of Singapore manages this, in part, through its strong support of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); over onequarter of Singaporean trade occurs with other ASEAN member
states. (Klingler-Vidra, 2012, 69-70)
Diplomatically, Singaporean political rulers have been
pragmatic in their relations with influential powers.

Opting not

to create formal alliances has given the small state more room to
maneuver.

Ultimately, the Republic of Singapore, despite its

close ties with the US and the PRC, seeks to be as independent as
possible, forging complex relations with many states.

Minister

Mentor Lee Kuan Yew summed up this position, “We are connected
with the world, we play a special role.

And we are not going to

be in anybody's pocket” (Klingler-Vidra, 2012, 67)
Strategy of the Republic of Singapore Toward Conflict in the SCS:
The Republic of Singapore perceives the disputes in the SCS
differently than the claimant states.

Its goals are not to obtain

resources within the region via historical or legal claim.
Singaporean rulers view freedom of navigation as the chief

The

73

concern, for any impedance on commercial shipping through the SCS
would surely disrupt the trade-dependent economy.

To manage their

stake in the SCS issue, the Republic of Singapore has developed
relations with nearly all states in the region, and has hedged
those relations by maintaining their close relationship with the
US as a balance against regional powers.

Affirming ties further,

officials representing the Republic of Singapore have consistently
advocated for US military presence in the region.

In addition to

external efforts, the SAF has established what is arguable the
most technologically advanced military in Southeast Asia for the
deterrence of threats to its sovereignty.
Singaporean rulers view the advance of PRC military
capabilities, and the subsequent pressure brought to bear on the
disputes with others who claim the geographic features and
resources of the SCS, as a logical outcome of the PRC's economic
growth.

For this reason, the representatives of the Singaporean

state have sought to minimize the concern regional states have
developed over this issue.

Through organizations such as ASEAN,

the Republic of Singapore seems to seek a resolution to the SCS
issue through diplomacy, regardless of which claimant states
maintain effective control of the disputed territory.

This

position is evident in a statement made by the Republic of
Singapore's Defense Chief Ng Eng Hen in April of 2012; Ng advised
that: “[i]t is vital to evolve a regional security architecture
which accommodates all stakeholders and rising aspirations.
Relationships marked predominantly by strategic rivalry will
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increase the risks of friction and conflict. We must therefore
engage in ways to increase understanding and confidence among
defence establishments”

(AsiaOne, 2012).

As peaceful resolution to the SCS issues and the maintenance
of status quo are the two circumstances under which the Republic
of Singapore's interests are secure, regional stability is the
foreign policy goal professed by state representatives.

While

building military-to-military ties with regional powers, including
the PRC, the maintaining and strengthening of US military presence
in the region has been facilitated by the Republic of Singapore as
the most sure means of ensuring stability.

It is clear that the

Republic of Singapore, though unwilling to engage in formal
military alliance, allows the US Navy and the USAF generous access
to its infrastructure, and has increased these allowances as the
disputes in the SCS have intensified.

In addition to these

allowances, the Republic of Singapore's foreign representatives
have vocally advocated for US military presence.

This trust in

the US military is related to the perception that the historic
presence of the US military in the region has promoted peace and
prosperity.

The common position of Singaporean rulers align with

Joseph Nye's view toward the maintenance of a US military presence
in East Asia, “[t]here are a number of reasons for East Asian
prosperity... among the most important... are American alliances
in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S.
Forces”; in essence, “[s]ecurity is like oxygen” (Nye, 1996).

In

April of 2012, Defense Chief Ng Eng Hen echoed this sentiment by
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suggesting that the US foreign policy shift from the Middle East
to Asia was “a useful reaffirmation” of the US position as
“resident power” in the region (Bennett, 2012).
In the event that a conflict over the disputed territories in
the SCS spreads or has greater implications, involving the Straits
of Malacca for instance, the SAF has produced a strong deterrence
and defensive position.

Unlike most regional powers that can only

purchase the majority of their advanced military equipment from
foreign entities, the Republic of Singapore has a robust arms
industry capable of producing naval vessels and refitting aircraft
(Gallagher, 1994, 176).

Singapore Technologies Engineering, the

firm which accounts for the majority of Singaporean arms
manufacturing, is the only defense manufacturer in Southeast Asia
to be recognized in the top 100 defense manufactures list
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), and has frequently sold advanced armaments to states such
as the United Kingdom (UK) (Economist, 2012).
Although domestic production of arms contributes greatly to
the effectiveness of the SAF, this does not overshadow the
importation of arms.

Between the years 2005 and 2009, the

Republic of Singapore increased arms imports by 146% (Weitz, 2011,
3).

By the year 2012, this small state ruling over only

approximately five million individuals became the world's fifthgreatest importer of arms, with 9.7 billion in imports when
measured by US Dollars, which equates 24% of the state budget
(Economist, 2012).

Of the advanced technologies purchased for the
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SAF, some have significant application to the SCS issue; for
example, six E2C early warning aircraft have been purchased and
deployed to monitor potential security risks, including the
Spratly Archipelago. (Gallagher, 1994, 176-177)
Moreover, the overall security strategy employed by the
Republic of Singapore toward the issues in the SCS consists of
engagement, external and internal balancing.

Singaporean foreign

policy is one of engagement with the aim of encouraging
cooperation between claimant states; as the accepted outcome of
the disputes in the SCS are of less concern than regional
stability, the Republic of Singapore has not taken sides, but
rather insisted that all claimants behave responsibly.

Military

engagement with other states through bilateral action and the FPDA
has bolstered the Republic of Singapore's position of neutrality
and non-alignment, but actions and statements have made clear that
the US-Singaporean military relationship is the top priority in
external defense matters.

The Republic of Singapore has plainly

revealed its faith in the US military's capacity to prevent the
PRC from utilizing its political and military size advantage over
other claimant states with regard to the SCS issue.

Due to the

geographic position and relatively small size of the state,
military expenditures have been greater than that of the average
state since formal independence; however, the Republic of
Singapore has been steadily increasing its military budget in
concert with other states in the region as a response to the
growing uncertainty that the SCS issue raises.

As a result, it
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possesses the most advanced and well-funded military force in
Southeast Asia.

In essence, if diplomacy and external balancing

fails, it seems that the Republic of Singapore has done more to
prepare for military conflict in the SCS than its neighboring
states.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
Changes to the International Order and the Objectives of the PRC:
The growing influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
was accepted during the period after the Asian financial crisis
which began in the year 1997; as the PRC was less effected by the
crisis and promoted a monetary policy that would not further
strain the commercial circumstances in the region, many analysts
were positive about role that the PRC would play in East Asia's
future.

This sentiment is embodied in the “good neighbor” policy

that referred to the region-centered policy initiatives taken by
the PRC, such as the PRC's participation in the ASEAN+3 summit and
its pledge to a “partnership of goodneighborliness and mutual
trust” (Lin et al. 2005,17).
Despite the PRC's new capacity to increase the stability and
overall prosperity of the region, the state's ascendency to great
power status can be argued to have had altered the balance of
power in the Asia-pacific region.

This is especially true in

Southeast Asia where there are no states in the region with the
capacity to challenge PRC military dominance (Roy, 2005, 305).
The global financial crisis that began in 2008, centered on the US
and European markets, has been argued to have emboldened the PRC
to formulate more assertive foreign policy.

This began to raise

concerns among the PRC's neighboring states, especially those with
whom disputes with the PRC over territory have resulted in
conflict, namely, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the
Republic of the Philippines.
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Generally, the economies of most East Asian states, including
the Republic of Singapore and claimant states, as measured by
Gross Domestic Product, have experienced substantial growth over
the last decade.

Although, due to the greater population size and

economic production controlled by the PRC, a wide disparity in
military expenditure has developed, with the PRC spending more
than all other claimant states combined (SIPRI, 2012, 30).
In addition to concerns about the PRC raising its rhetoric
over the disputed islands, the regional great power has
simultaneously advanced its capacity to effectively control the
South China Sea (SCS) through an increase in military spending,
patrolling the sea, and the upgrading of civilian and military
installations.

A powerful example of these efforts is the

establishment of Sansha Municipality (Sānshā Shì).

Sansha

Municipality, consisting of only an airstrip, a government
building and residence for several hundred persons on a 13 square
kilometer island of the Paracel Group, has been publicly declared
as mechanism for increasing the PRC's control of the region.

When

speaking about the establishment of this new and southernmost
manifestation of the PRC, Sansha Municipality Mayor Xiao Jie
stated that it “a wise decision made by the party and the
government of China to protect the sovereign rights of China, and
to strengthen the protection and the development of natural
resources” (Olesen, 2012).
While the PRC objectives have been laid bare, all states with
interests in the SCS surely realize that these PRC objectives are
supported by historical planning, driven by a need to establish
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security, and made necessary by internal pressure.

The vision of

protecting the interests of the PRC from the pressure of foreign
navies was given by PLAN Admiral Liu Huaqing; if the PRC is to
sercure its interests and protect its shores, it must have a navy
capable of controlling the waters to the first island chain, which
would encapsulate the PRC's claims in the SCS.

The historical

trend is moving in the direction of fulfilling the plan directed
by Liu; the increases in PLAN capacity and installations such as
Sansha Municipality are evidence of this.

The motives behind the

PRC's policy in the SCS can also be explained in terms of security
concerns.

In a report issued by the think tank, International

Crisis Group, analysts note the security dilemma providing to PRC
policy by stating: “China’s claims to the South China Sea, along
with its assertive approach, have rattled other claimants. But
China is not stoking tensions on its own. South East Asian
claimants, with Vietnam and the Philippines in the forefront, are
now more forcefully de-fending their claims – and enlisting
outside allies – with considerable energy” (ICG, 2012, 1).

If

other claimant states are attempting to secure their claims, this
could disrupt the PRC's capacity to ensure the flow of resources
it needs to maintain economic growth and future access to
resources contained within the SCS.

With regard to internal

pressures, a decrease in economic growth may have a destabilizing
effect on the political environment.

As one facet of regime

legitimacy rests on the further development of the economy, the
PRC must maintain a semblance of control over a growing economy.
The other facet of regime legitimacy rest on the satisfaction of
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nationalist sentiment which has developed within the PRC
territory. Essentially, the PRC must not be viewed as capitulating
to its weak neighbors or the states which were once colonial
masters in the region; thus the integration of territory that has
been argued to be part of the historical Chinese motherland must
be eventually achieved and strong stance on the PRC claims in the
SCS maintained.
The Perceived Interests of the US in the South China Sea:
Since the year 1949 when the Truman Administration announced
the US Defensive Perimeter Strategy in East Asia, East Asia has
been formally declared an area of great security interest to the
US, worthy of an intense military presence.

The concept of a US

Defensive Perimeter eventually came to encompass all territory and
ocean East of a line drawn from the Aleutian island chain, through
the Japanese Islands, the southern half of the Korean Peninsula,
the island of Taiwan, and ending with the Philippine islands.
(Pearson, 2008, 49-50)
In addition to the historical justifications for military
bases and various manifestations of military resource allocations
throughout East Asia (i.e. Japanese Reconstruction post-occupation
or Soviet Containment), the US perceives that the maintenance of
stability in the region is of vital interest due to the extent to
which East Asia and the shipping lanes of the SCS are a key
component of global trade and economic prosperity.

To ensure this

end, the executive branch insists on a persistent military
presence.

Illustrating this position in the year 2011, US Defense

Secretary Robert Gates at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit
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in Singapore championed US support for, “freedom of navigation and
unimpeded economic development and commerce and respect for
international law” (Miles, 2011).

This commitment to freedom of

navigation results in a commitment of US forces in the SCS region,
however, challenges existed for the US as forces were busy with
multiple occupations in central Asia at the time of formal policy
creation.

In 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke to

this reality: “[in the last] decade, our foreign policy has
transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War peace dividend to
demanding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As those wars wind
down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new global
realities”, and these new global realities are centered on the
advancing capacity of the PRC in the international system, and
East Asia in particular (Clinton, 2011).

As the term 'pivot' was

viewed as implying too much attention toward the PRC, policy of
increasing US capacity in East Asia has become known as rebalancing (Brewster, 2012).
The re-balancing policy is designed to accomplish several
forward-looking goals.

Most germane to territorial disputes in

East Asia, the US seeks to ensure allied states such as the State
of Japan that it will uphold treaties.

Rekindling the allegiance

with such powerful states has implications for the continuance of
trade as well as for balancing.

Coupled with general concerns for

trade stability in the region, re-balancing in Asia allows the US
to protect its trade interests from the East coast of Africa to
the West coast of North America.

As US naval assets are equally

distributed between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific waters
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currently, the growing importance of East Asia has prompted the US
leadership to shift the focus of US military presence from the
relatively peaceful and secure Atlantic toward the contested areas
in the SCS and Asia more broadly. (Brewster, 2012)
The Relative Power of Weaker Claimant States Vis-A-Vis the PRC:
The failure of bilateral agreements with the PRC compounded
with the futility of multilateral efforts, such as those through
the ASEAN forum, has brought the Hanoi and Manila regimes to
strengthen their power in the face of the advancement of the PRC
in the SCS.

Both states have increased their military capacity

with a focus on their navies' ability to defend the waters
surrounding their territorial claims in the SCS.

With an increase

in the volume of imported naval equipment and selectivity toward
the equipment and vessels well-suited for deployment in the SCS,
it is clear that both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the
Republic of the Philippines see their place in a “self-help”
international system in which internal balancing is necessary for
to ensure their interests.
Despite efforts to increase their military power, both
claimant states described in this paper do not posses an
industrial base, let alone an economy, great enough to supply it
with enough arms to deter the advance of the PRC.

The security

dilemma which has developed between the PRC and other claimant
states has provoked the weaker state to enlist “outside allies”
(ICG, 2012, 1).

As the United States (US) military possesses the

greatest naval power which currently patrols the SCS, and its
political leaders have paid much attention to the importance of
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peaceful resolution and freedom of navigation through the disputed
waters, an allegiance with the US would be the most sensible means
by which either state could externally balance the PRC.

The

Manila regime seems most keen to rekindle its military
relationship with the US; the ease of this foreign policy decision
comes in part due to the historical relationship between these two
states and the defense treaty which is still active.

The Hanoi

regime, conversely, has not enjoyed a good relationship with the
US historically.

As a consequence, the extent to which it can use

the US as an external balancer is limited.

Regardless, it is

clear by the recent military-to-military ties between the US and
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam that rulers in Hanoi would
prefer to increase the role of the US in its SCS strategy.

As the

Socialist Republic of Vietnam cannot rely on the US, as does the
Republic of the Philippines, it has created a more complex network
of relationships in its efforts to balance PRC power.

Hanoi has

increased relations with the Russian Federation, as the military
and diplomatic relationship between the them has been relatively
cooperative since the founding of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam.
In addition to formal military ties, both the Hanoi and Manila
regimes have engaged in contracting for oil reserve exploration
and exploitation in the disputed waters of the SCS.

For the Hanoi

leadership, contracting with firms based in powerful states is a
form of soft-balancing.

Contracting with US, Russian Federation,

and Republic of India-based firms, the Hanoi regime has created a
web of interests in the hydrocarbon reserves which are arguably a
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crucial component of the disputes.

The most notable success of

this contract-policy has been with the Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation (ONGC).

The contracts with this firm are deemed so

valuable to the Republic of India, that the navy issued a threat
of force if the supply were to be interrupted.
Hedging with External Balancing: Continuity in Regional Strategy
The uncertain future of the region plays a decisive role in
how these states are aligning themselves.

While attempting to

balance the PRC, both internally and externally, the three states
analyzed in this paper cannot fully do so to the detriment of
relations with the PRC, although for the Manila regime, the
relationship is deteriorating.

As the PRC is the regions greatest

trading partner and potential hegemon, for the sake of long-term
considerations and for stability in the present, these states to
engage with the PRC.

While it cannot be considered bandwagoning,

the Republic of Singapore, the Republic of the Philippines and the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam have maintained trading relations,
and for the Singaporean and Vietnamese military, military
exchanges with the PRC.

In essence, Southeast Asian states cannot

help but engage with the PRC due to proximity and level of
economic integration, and for the sake of not alarming the PRC,
thus avoiding a strong reaction, weaker states in the region
generally choose not to increase ties with other powers to the
complete isolation of the PRC.
The most common strategical choice for weaker states in the
presence of a rising power, in the case the PRC, is to balance.
As argued above, claimant states are employing balancing as their
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chief mechanism to deter PRC aggression.

The Republic of

Singapore, while not a claimant state, is also supporting the
involvement of a balancing power in the region.

For historical

reasons, a faith in the US military's capacity to keep peace in
the region, Singaporean rulers have championed an increase of US
military presence.
Moreover, it seems that weaker states have responded to the
rise of PRC power and its implications for the SCS with a mixed
strategy of trade relations, mild engagement, and hedging.

This

hedging is accomplished first through a prudent increase in the
amount of internal power that a state can allocate to protect its
interests in the SCS.

This has been done through investing in

application specific hardware that can be deployed to the SCS
(i.e. early-warning aircraft, anti-submarine equipment, etc).
However, as noted, procuring and adequate level of internal power
to balance the PRC is not a realizable goal for any state in
Southeast Asia.

Consequently, the Hanoi, Manila and Singaporean

regimes have sought military relations with great powers, with the
US being chief among them, as a means to balance the growing
military power of the PRC.

As the maintenance of status-quo in

the SCS is the most reasonable short-term goal, these relatively
weaker states have been increasing their power and military
relations to deter any aggression by the PRC, while engaging with
the Beijing regime with an aim to postpone dispute resolution
indefinitely.

87

Sources Cited:
Acharya, Amitav. "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?."International
Security. 28. no. 3 (2003): 149-164.
Ambrosia, Sabrina. "China-Philippines Territorial Standoff Leads To
Clampdown on Trade; Economic Sanctions Likely." International
Business Times, May 14, 2012. http://www.ibtimes.com/chinaphilippines-territorial-standoff-leads-clampdown-trade-economicsanctions-likely-698215 (accessed March 22, 2013).
ABS-SBNnews. "Philippine Navy buying 2 Italian warships." ABSCBNnews.com, August 02, 2012. http://www.abscbnnews.com/nation/08/02/12/philippine-navy-buying-2-italianwarships (accessed March 23, 2013).
ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "1992 ASEAN Declaration
On The South China Sea." Last modified 22 July, 1992. Accessed
March 27, 2013.
AsiaOne, "Singapore, US reaffirm bilateral military ties." Last
modified 2012. Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://news.asiaone.com/News/Latest
News/Singapore/Story/A1Story20120405-337998.html.
Beng, Kor Kian. "Fishing for Trouble in South China Sea." Jakarta
Globe, August 31, 2012.
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/asia/fishing-for-trouble-in-southchina-sea/541559 (accessed April 1, 2013).
Bennett, John T. USNews, "War Drums: Singapore's Defense Chief Warns of
U.S.-China Conflict." Last modified 2012. Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/04/04/war-drumssingapores-defense-chief-warns-of-us-china-conflict.

88

Brewster, David. "'Asian pivot' is really an 'Asian re-balance'." The
Interpreter: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 22,
2012. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/06/22/Asian-pivotis-really-an-Asian-rebalance.aspx (accessed April 26, 2013).
Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.
—China Strategic Rivalry."Washington Quarterly. 35. no. 2 (2012):
139-156.
Chanlett-Avery, Emma. Congressional Research Service (US), "Singapore:
Background and U.S. Relations." Last modified February 25. 2011.
Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20490.pdf.
Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy, November
2011.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_
century?page=0,6 (accessed April 26, 2013).
Cronin, Richard P. "China's Assertiveness Threatens Peace in the South
China Sea." Investors Business Daily, April 02, 2013.
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-viewpoint/040213-650117china-claims-oil-gas-rich-waters-and-seabed.htm?ref=SeeAlso
(accessed April 3, 2013).
Dutta, Sujit. "Securing the Sea Frontier: China’s Pursuit of
Sovereignty Claims in the South China Sea."Strategic Analysis. 29.
no. 2 (2005): 269-294.
Dzurek, Daniel J. "China Occupies Mischief Reef in Latest Spratly
Gambit." IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin. 3. no. 1 (1995): 6571.
EC. European Commission, "VIETNAM: EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH

89

THE WORLD." Last modified 2012. Accessed April 5, 2013.
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113463
.pdf.
Economist, "Military spending in South-East Asia: Shopping spree." Last
modified 2012. Accessed April 1, 2013.
http://www.economist.com/node/21551056.
Emmers, Ralf. "ASEAN, China and the South China Sea: An Opportunity
Missed" working paper., Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Singapore, 2002.
Erickson, Andrew S. "Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns."
China Brief. 15. no. 13 (2009): 4-8.
Gallagher, Michael G. "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea."
International Security. 19. no. 1 (1994): 169-194.
Garver, John W. "China's Push through the South China Sea: The
Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests."China
Quarterly. 132. (1992): 999-1028. Print.
Gau, Sheng-Ti. "The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean
Disputes in the South China Sea."Ocean Development & International
Law. 43. (2012): 57-69. Print.
Holmes, James R; Yoshihara, Toshi. "China's "Caribbean" in the South
China Sea."SAIS Review of International Affairs;. 26.1 (2006): 7992. Print.
Hsiao, Russel. "In a Fortnight: PLA General Advises Building Bases in
the South China Sea." China Brief. 15. no. 13 (2009): 1-2.
Hyer, Eric. "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's
Earlier Territorial Settlements."Pacific Affairs. 68.1 (1995): 3454. Print.

90

ICG. International Crisis Group, "Stirring up the South China Sea (II):
Regional Responses." Last modified 2012. Accessed April 2, 2013.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/229stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-ii-regional-responses.
IEA. International Energy Agency, "World Energy Outlook 2004." Last
modified 2004. Accessed April 2, 2013.
Jaleco, Rodney. "PH Navy needs bigger warships." ABS-CBN North America
News Bureau, June 01, 2012. http://www.abscbnnews.com/nation/06/01/12/ph-navy-needs-bigger-warships.html
(accessed March 23, 2013).
Ji, Guoxing. "China Versus South China Sea Security."Security Dialogue.
29.101 (1998): n. page. Print.
Kang, David C. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical
Frameworks." International Security. 27. no. 4 (2003): 57-85.
Keck, Zachary. "India's South China Sea Gambit." The Diplomat, December
5, 2012. http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/12/05/indiassouth-china-sea-gambit/ (accessed March 4, 2013).
Klingler-Vidra, Robyn. London School of Economics and Political
Science, "The pragmatic ‘little red dot’: Singapore’s US hedge
against China." Last modified 2012. Accessed February 22, 2013.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/47506/1/The pragmatic ‘little red
dot(lsero).pdf.
Kreft, Heinrich. "China's Energy Security Conundrum."The Korean Journal
of Defense Analysis. 18. no. 3 (2006): 107-120.
Lander, Mark. "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed
Islands." The New York Times, July 23, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html?_r=0

91

(accessed April 26, 2013).
Lee, Jeongseok. Hedging against Uncertain Future: The Response of East
Asian Secondary Powers to Rising China. lecture., International
Political Science Association XXII World Congress of Political
Science, 2012.
Li, Jian. "Moscow Adds to South China Sea Poker Stakes." Global Times,
November 29, 2012. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/747164.shtml
(accessed April 4, 2013).
Li, Jinming, and Dexia Li. "The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the
South China Sea: A Note."Ocean Development &International Law. 34.
(2003): 287-295.
Lin, Gang, John W. Garver, Dennis V. Hickey, and Michael R. Chambers.
"China’s “Good Neighbor” Diplomacy: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?."
Asia Program. Special Report. 126 (2005): 1-24.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 16601783. BiblioLife, 2008. Print.
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York:
W.W.Norton Company Inc., 2001.
McIndoe, Alastair. "Philippines, US hold war games amid row with
China." The Straits Times, April 17, 2012.
http://www.asianewsnet.net/news-29663.html (accessed April 1,
2013).
Miles, Donna. American Forces Press Service, "U.S. Urges Negotiation in
the South China Sea Disputes." Last modified June 21, 2011.
Accessed April 20, 2013.
Ministry of Defense (Singapore), "Defending Singapore in the 21st
Century." Last modified 2000. Accessed April 1, 2013.

92

http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Singapore-2000.pdf.
Nye, Joseph. "The Case for Deep Engagement." Foreign Affairs. 74. no. 4
(1995): 90-102.
Odgaard, Liselotte. "The South China Sea: ASEAN's Security Concerns
about China."Security Dialogue. 34.11 (2003): 11-24. Print.
Olesen, Alexa. "Sansha, China's New 'City,' Strengthens Country's
Foothold In Disputed Waters."Huffington Post, July 24, 2012.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/24/sanshachina_n_1697523.html (accessed April 9, 2013).
Pearson. The USA and containment of 2 communism in Asia, 1945–1950.
manuscript., Pearson Schools and Fe Colleges, 2008.
http://www.pearsonschoolsandfecolleges.co.uk/Secondary/History/16p
lus/ASandA2OCRHistoryA/Samples/ASStudentBookSampleChapters/TheUSAa
ndtheColdWarinAsia1945-1975Chapter2.pdf.
PRC. People's Republic of China, "CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (Adopted on December 4, 1982)." Last modified 1982.
Accessed April 2, 2013.
PRC. Ministry of Defense, "China's National Defense in 2004." Last
modified 2004. Accessed August 4, 2012.
http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/28/content_18078.htm.
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
Roque, H.Harry L. "Palmas Arbitration Revisited."Philippine Law
Journal. 77. no. 4 (2002): 437-462.
Rowan, Joshua P. "UNCLOS and Sovereignty Claims in the South China
Sea." Asian Survey. 45. no. 3 (2005): 1-7.
Roy, Denny. "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?."
Contemporary Southeast Asia. no. 2 (2005): 305-322.

93

Senado ng Pilipinas. The Senate of the Republic of the Philippines,
"REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7898 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Last
modified 1995. Accessed March 12, 2013.
http://www.gppb.gov.ph/laws_rules/laws/RA_7898.pdf.
SIPRI, ed. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Stockholm:
2012. s.v. "Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data,
2011."
Spinetta, Lawrence. “THE MALACCA DILEMMA” — COUNTERING CHINA’S “STRING
OF PEARLS” WITH LAND-BASED AIRPOWER. Thesis., SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
AIR AND SPACE STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY, 2006.
Storey, Ian James. "Creeping assertiveness: China, the Philippines and
the South China Sea dispute."Contemporary Southeast Asia. 21.1
(1999): 95-118. Print.
Tonnesson, Stein. "Vietnam's objective in the South China Sea: National
or regional security?."Contemporary Southeast Asia. 22.1 (2000):
199-220. Print.
UN. United Nations, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."
Last modified 1982. Accessed February 2, 2013.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unc
los_e.pdf.
Walt, Stephen M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories."
Foreign Policy. Spring Edition. no. 110 (1998): 29-32 34-46.
Weitz, Richard. "Nervous Neighbors: China Finds a Sphere of Influence."
World Affairs. March/April. (2011).
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/nervous-neighborschina-finds-sphere-influence (accessed February 2, 2013).

94

Zhang, Hongzhou. China’s Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for
Regional and Global Maritime Security. working paper., S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, 2012.

95

Index of Acronyms and Abbreviations
AFP:
ASBM:
ASEAN:
EEZ:
CLWP:
CMSA:
DPRK:
FPDA:
GDP:
ONGC:
SOE)
PLA:
PLAN:
PN:
PRC:
ROC:
SAF:
SIPRI:
SOE:
SCS:
UK:
UN:
UNCLOS:
US:
USAF:
USSR:

the Armed Forces of the Philippines
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Exclusive Economic Zone (UNCLOS Provision)
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the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (a Republic of India
the People's Liberation Army
the People's Liberation Army Navy
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the People's Republic of China
the Republic of China
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the South China Sea
the United Kingdom
the United Nations
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
the United States
the United States Air Force
the Soviet Union

